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Performance Motivation:

Tests of An Integrated Model

Performance is usually defined as the level of
achievement on some dimension during some period of time
(Vroom, 1964, p.196).

Even the most casual observer would

agree that different individuals (or the same individual at
different times) engaged in the same task, with the same
ability, and facing the same environmental constraints,
often exert varying amounts of effort.

To the extent that

performance is a function of effort, it follows that they
also perform at different levels.

When asked to explain

these differences in performance, both practitioners and
academicians are likely to attribute the differences in
performance to differences in motivation.
While motivation is often used to explain variance in
performance, there is little agreement on precisely how such
a construct should be defined or measured.

steers and

Porter (1983) summarize four prominent researchers'
definition of motivation:
Atkinson (1964):

the contemporary (immediate)

influences on the direction, vigor, and
persistence of action.
Jones (1955):

how behavior gets started, is

energized, is sustained, is directed, is stopped,
and what kind of subjective reaction is present in
the organism while all this is going on.
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Vroom (1964):

a process governing choices made by

persons or lower orgenisms among alternative forms
of voluntary activity.
Campbell & Pritchard (1976):

a set of

independent/dependent variable relationships that
explain the direction, amplitude, and persistence
of an individual's behavior, holding constant the
effects of aptitude, skill, and understanding of
the task, and the constraints operating in the
environment.
Cognitive motivation theories, such as goal setting or
expectancy theory, hypothesize that the direction,
amplitude, and persistence of behavior is influenced by
unobservable mental constructs and processes.

Within a

cognitive framework Campbell and Pritchard's definition can
be clarified by specifying that the domain of motivation
theories is the study of the relationship between
unobservable emotional and cognitive constructs and the
direction, amplitude, and persistence of behavior while
holding other factors (such as ability and environmental
constraints) constant.
Also, because an individual's emotions and mental
processes are influenced by environmental stimuli,
motivation may also be studied as a dependent variable.

In

such a case the focus is on identifying the variables which
influence those emotional and cognitive constructs related
to the direction, amplitude, and persistence of behavior.
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Existing Cognitive Motivation Theories

For the last 20 years goal setting theory and
expectancy theories have been two of the most prominent
cognitive theories of motivation.
Goal setting

A goal is what an individual is trying to accomplish.
It is the object or aim of an action.

The term goal refers

to attaining a specific standard of proficiency on a task,
usually within a specified time limit (Locke, Saari, Shaw, &
Latham, 1981).

Because the definition of goals is the same

as Vroom's (1964, p. 196) definition of performance, the
terms "performance level" and "goal level" are synonymous.
Other synonyms include the terms "performance standard,"
"quota," "work norm," "task," "objective," "deadline," and
"budget" (Locke et al., 1981, p. 126).

As the diversity of

terms indicates, goals have important implications for
fields as different as strategic management (Richards,
1986), cost accounting (Horngren, 1982), and sports (Locke &
Latham, 1985).
The goal construct has a historical research stream
which begins with the work of Lewin and his associates on
the determinants of the level of aspiration {Miner, 1980,
p.169), the work of Drucker, McGregor, Odiorne, and others
on management by objectives (Miner, 1980, p. 169), and even
back to Fredrick Taylor, the father of scientific management
(Locke, 1978).
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Much of the recent interest in goals began in the
1960's as a result of the investigation of the effects of
goal setting by Locke (primarily lab experiments) and Latham
(primarily field experiments).

These theorists had two

fundamental hypotheses (Locke et al., 1981)
1. specific goals lead to higher performance than
"do your best" goals, or no goals; and
2. difficult goals lead to higher performance than
easy goals.
The goals ref erred to in these hypotheses are an
individual's goals, but the tests of the theory usually
investigated the relationship between assigned goals and
performance.

Experimenters assigned goals by telling

subjects that their goal was to achieve a certain level of
performance within a given time period.
Although Austin and Bobko (1985) criticized goal
setting theory for being narrowly focused and failing to
consider areas such as goal conflict (i.e. quantity goals
vs. quality goals), conflicts in goal-setting processes,
individual versus group levels of analysis, and laboratory
versus field settings most reviewers conclude that there is
considerable empirical support for the two basic hypotheses
(for reviews of empirical studies see Austin & Bobko, 1985;
Campbell, 1982; Latham, 1984; Latham & Yukl, 1975; Locke,
1968; Locke, et al., 1981; Steers & Porter, 1974; and Tubbs,
1986).
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Locke et al. (1981) concluded that the effect of goals
on performance is one of the most robust and replicable
findings in the psychological literature.

Another author

(Pinder, 1977, p. 169) commented that goal setting theory
has demonstrated more scientific validity than any other
theory of work motivation.

Chidester and Grigsby (1984)

state, "Unequivocally, setting either difficult or specific
goals reliably results in increased productivity."

In

summary, this theory uses assigned goals to explain
motivational differences in performance.

To apply this

theory one would assign difficult, specific goals-presumably the more difficult and more specific, the better.
Expectancy Theories

The other major cognitive motivation theory used by
practitioners and academicians over the last fifty years is
expectancy theory.

Expectancy theory has been called, "the

dominant paradigm for research on work-related motivation"
(Connolly, 1976) , and, "the most widely accepted theory of
work and motivation among today's organizational
psychologists" (Wahba, & House, 1974).

The term "expectancy

theory" does not refer to a specific theory, but to a body
of related theories which hypothesize that people engage in
a particular behavior because they choose to, and that their
choices are based on "expectations" about the consequences
of their

action~.

Individuals engage in behaviors which

they believe will result in pleasure, and avoid behaviors
they believe will result in pain (Lawler, 1973).
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While most

expectancy theories share these

assumptions, there are at least two major conceptualizations
of the way these expectations affect the direction,
intensity, and persistence of behavior:

expectancy theory

choice models and expectancy theory force models.
Expectancy theory choice models.

These models proposes

that motivation is the result of an internal decision making
process (House, Shapiro, & Wahba, 1974).

While expectancy

theory concepts can be found in the work of Lewin (1935) and
Tolman (1932), and Georgopoulos, Mahoney, and Jones (1957),
the first major appearance in organizational psychology was
Vroom's 1964 book Work and Motivation.
Vroom's version of expectancy theory has two
fundamental assumptions.

The first assumption is that

individuals have beliefs about the outcomes (consequences)
which result from their behavior, and the causal
relationship among these outcomes (Vroom, pp. 17-18).

These

beliefs are referred to as either expectancies or
instrumentalities, and are similar to Kelly's (1973) notion
of people as "naive scientists".
The second hypothesis is that individuals have
affective reactions to outcomes.

Affective reactions

reflect the attractiveness, anticipated satisfaction, or, in
Vroom's terminology, the valence of outcomes (Vroom, 1964,
pp. 15-17).

While there is still uncertainty as to the

determinants of these valences, one of the major
determinants is believed to be the pleasure or pain outcomes
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provide (Vroom, 1964; Lawler, 1973).

The term valence can

be considered the equivalent of the term utility as used by
subjective utility theorist such as Edwards (1955) and
Savage (1954) (Sussmann & Vecchio, 1985).
When faced with a choice between alternative behaviors,
the individual will choose the behavior which he/she
anticipate will provide the most pleasure or avoid the most
pain.

This evaluation and decision making process is often

referred to as "hedonistic calculus" (Lawler, 1973).

Vroom

discusses a variety of choices such as occupational choice,
and choice among performance or effort levels.

In terms of

performance motivation, the theory predicts that individuals
faced with a choice between high and low effort will pick
the effort level with the highest expected value.

If they

believe high effort to have a higher expected value than low
effort they will choose to exert a high level of effort, and
will be considered to be "highly motivated."

If the

expected value of low effort is greater than the expected
value of high effort, they will choose to exert a low level
of effort, and will be considered "unmotivated."

In

summary, this model uses expected values to predict an
individual's choice of a personal goal level, then uses
differences in personal goal level to explain motivational
differences in performance.
To apply this theory one would attempt to make high
performance more rewarding than low performance.
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Expectancy theory motivational force model.

Although a

major focus of Vroom's model is predicting behavior on the
basis of within subject choices, early tests of the theory
did not use a within subjects choice to predict behavior,
but, instead, used between subject differences in the
attractiveness of a single alternative (such as high
performance) to predict behavior (see Schwab, Olian-Gottleib
& Heneman, 1979 for a review of this literature).

These

models have been referred to as single force models
(Kennedy, Fossum, & White, 1983).

The hypothesis was that

the greater the motivational force toward high performance,
the more highly motivated the individual would be toward
high performance, the more effort they would exert, and the
higher their performance would be.

The motivational force

toward high performance was a funtion of the expected value
of high performance.

In summary, this theory uses

motivational force to explain motivational differences in
performance.

To apply this theory one would increase

motivation by increasing the magnitude of the expected value
of high performance.
Problems with Existing Theories
Using any one of the existing theories alone to explain
as complex a phenomenon as motivation, has inherent
problems.

Any one of the theories makes predictions which

are inconsistent with both common sense and empirical
reality.
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Problems With the Goal Setting Model

The first problem with the goal setting model is the
hypothesized linear relationship between goal difficulty and
performance (Mento, Cartledge, & Locke, 1980; Locke et al.,
1986).

This implies that assigning increasingly difficult

goals results in increasingly higher levels of performance.
Based on goal setting theory alone, one would conclude that
the only action necessary to solve motivation problems is to
assign difficult, specific goals--presumably the more
difficult and the more specific the better.

As a matter of

fact, some researchers have taken the position that it may
be better to assign unattainable goals (Garland, 1982,
1983).

While there is some empirical evidence which

supports this position (Garland, 1982, 1983; Locke, 1982)
there are also a number of studies which did not obtain a
simple linear relationship between assigned goals and
performance (Atkinson & Feather, 1966; Ivancevich and
McMahon 1977; Latham & Saari, 1979; Motowidlo, Loehar, &
Dunnette, 1978; Steers & Porter 1974).
Goal setting alone is unable to explain why an
individual will choose one goal over another, or why
individuals with the same goal will vary in the amount of
effort they exert.

As a result, a number of different

reviewers (Latham & Yukl, 1975; Campbell, 1982; Campion &
Lord, 1982; Chacko & McElroy, 1983; Naylor & Ilgen, 1984;
Steers & Porter, 1974) have reached the conclusion that goal
setting alone is an inadequate theory of motivation.
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At one point even Locke (1975) believed that goal
setting was not a theory, but a motivation technique (for a
dissenting view see Miner,1980).
Problems With the Expectancy Choice Model

An expectancy choice model, on the other hand, would
indicate that the only condition necessary for motivation is
that high performance be perceived as having a higher
expected value than low performance.

This means that an

individual would be equally motivated if the difference
between high and low performance was one dollar or a million
dollars.

This theory (like goal setting theory) is

incapable of explaining why individuals with the same goal
may exert varying amounts of effort.
Problems With the Expectancy Force Model

An expectancy force model does explain why individuals
with the same goal may exert differing amounts of effort.
The difference would be due to differences in motivational
force.

However, it cannot explain goal choice.

This theory

would predict that an individual would exert more effort if
the expected value of high performance was one million
dollars than he/she would if the expected value was one
dollar.

However, it ignores the possibility that the

expected value of low performance may be higher than the
expected value of high performance and, therefore, the
individual has a low

pe~formance

goal and exerts little

effort--no matter what the magnitude of the expected value
of high performance is.
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A motivation theory should be capable of explaining
both the direction and intensity of behavior.

With respect

to goals, the theory should be able to explain goal choice
(direction) and the effort exerted toward a goal
(intensity).

Any one of the theories alone is incapable of

explaining both direction and intensity.
Solvinq the Problems with Existinq Theories
Two approaches have been used to solve the problems
with existing theories, 1) the theories have been viewed as
complementary and two or more of the theories integrated
(and the strengths of one theory used to offset the weakness
of another theory), or 2) the theories have been viewed as
contradictory (one of the theories is right and the others
are wrong) and additional constructs have been added to one
of the theories.
Theories as complementary
Because the goal setting theory's major weakness is its
inability to explain goal choice (Latham & Yukl, 1975), and
since the expectancy theory choice model is formulated as an
i~ternal

decision making model (House et al., 1974),

theorists have argued that expectancy theory is a logical
complement to goal setting theory (Campbell, Dunnette,
Lawler, & Weick, 1970; Daehler & Mobley, 1973; Erez, Earley,
& Hulin, 1985; Erez & Kanfer, 1983; Evans, 1986; Garland,
1985; Latham & Yukl, 1975; Locke, 1968; Locke, Lee, & Bobko,
1984; Locke, Motowidlo, & Bobko, 1986; Motowidlo, et al.,
1978; Naylor & Ilgen, 1984; and Steers & Porter, 1974;).
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Theories as Contradictory

It has also been argued that goal setting and
expectancy force theories are contradictory (Mento et al.,
1980; Motowidlio et al., 1978).

Reviewers have criticized

the expectancy motivational force model as an unacceptable
operationalization of expectancy theory (Conolly, 1976;
Heneman & Schwab, 1971; House & Wahba, 1972; Mitchell, 1974;
Mitchell, 1979; Mitchell, 1982; Mitchell & Biglan, 1971;
Wahba & House, 1974).
If the existing theories are contradictory, problems
with existing theories (such as obtaining a non-linear
relationship between assigned goals and performance) must be
overcome by the addition of new constructs.

For example,

goal setting researchers explained the non-linear
relationship between assigned goals and performance by
saying that subjects did not accept the goal (introducing a
new construct-goal acceptance) or were not committed to the
goal (introducing a new construct-goal commitment).
The introduction of additional goal constructs
introduces a new set of problems.

Goal setting theory alone

offers no explanation as to what determines goal acceptance
or goal commitment (Locke, Latham, & Erez, 1988).

If the

determinants of goal acceptance and goal commitment are not
clearly specified, predictions about goal acceptance and
commitment cannot be made, and goal setting theory becomes
untestable.
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To quote Latham and Yukl,
the greatest deficiency of Locke's theory is the
failure to specify the determinants of goal
acceptance and goal commitment.

(1975, p. 841)

Consequently, a great deal of recent research has focused on
the development of two new goal setting theory constructs-goal acceptance and goal commitment (i.e. Hollenbeck and
Klein, 1987; Leifer and McGannon, 1986; Locke et al., 1988).
Justification for Proposed Theory Development
Before developing new constructs it must first be
determined whether goal acceptance/goal commitment are
really new constructs or are simply new names for constructs
which already exist in other theories.

Garland (1982, 1984)

and Locke, Frederick, Lee, and Bobko (1984) concluded that
goal setting and expectancy theory are no longer in
conflict.

If the theories are not contradictory, and the

goal acceptance/goal commitment constructs can be explained
by integrating existing theories, it would be preferable to
use existing theories rather than continue the development
of new constructs.

Integrating existing theories is more

parsimonious, has the advantage of using the body of
knowledge associated with existing theories, and makes a
significant theoretical contribution by providing what Landy
and Becker (1987) have labeled a "middle range" type of
motivation theory--a

more comprehensive theory capable of

explaining both the direction and the intensity of behavior.
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Using an integrated theory to specify the determinants
of goal acceptance and goal commitment clarifies the
relationship between goals and other motivation constructs
and theories, improves our understanding of why so may
conflicting results have appeared when goal setting has
attempted to address issues such as the role of extrinsic
rewards and the probability of success, and allows more
precise predictions about goal acceptance and goal
commitment than is possible with models such as those
proposed by Locke et al. (1988) or Hollenbeck and Klein
(1987).
To be successful an integrated theory must (1) resolve
the confusion between goal acceptance and goal commitment,
(2) resolve the perceived conflict between goal setting and
expectancy theory, and (3) resolve the perceived conflict
between the expectancy choice model and the expectancy force
model.

Reconciling these conflicts will assist

practitioners by explaining why an individual will choose
one performance goal level but not another, why an
individual will accept one assigned goal but not another,
and why individuals with the same goal level may exert
different amounts of effort.
These issues are addressed both conceptually and
empirically.

Chapter 2 reviews relevant literature,

proposes an integrated model, and derives testable
hypotheses.

Chapter 3 describes a laboratory study used to

test the major hypotheses derived in Chapter 2, Chapter 4
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presents the results, and Chapter 5 contains the
conclusions, discussion and implications.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review

Because of the extensive literature which exist for
both goal setting and expectancy theories, and because the
focus of this study is on integrated models, only studies
comparing two or more theories are reviewed in detail.
literature review contains a summary of:

The

1) the goal

setting, expectancy choice, and expectancy force models,
2) arguments for and against integration, 3) development of
the goal acceptance/goal commitment constructs, and 4) a
description of an integrated theory.

The review concludes

with the hypotheses derived from the integrated theory.
Goal Setting, Expectancy Choice, and Expectancy Force Models
The Goal Setting Model
While Locke has attributed his interest in goal setting
to Mace (1935)

(Locke, 1966a, 1966b) and Ryan (1958)

(Locke,

1968), most recent interest in goal setting is the result of
the research began by Locke and Bryan in the 1960's (Bryan,
& Locke, 1967a, 1967b; Locke, 1966a, 1966b, 1967, 1968;
Locke & Bryan, 1966a, 1966b, 1967a, 1967b, 1968a, 1968b).
The fundamental premise of these studies is that people have
goals and intentions which affect what he/she does, and
goals are the most immediate regulators of performance
(Locke & Bryan, 1968b).

They propose that

~s

the difficulty

of an individual's goal increases, task performance
increases (Locke, 1968).
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These propositions were an attempt to refute the
behavioral, noncognitive, position of some researchers
(Locke, 1968, Locke 1972, Locke, 1975).

Although Locke was

a cognitive theorist, the proposition that individual goals
(IG) determine behavior, and subsequently individual
performance (P), does not apply to all behavior, but only to
purposive, goal-directed behavior.

While arguing that most

behavior is goal directed, Locke conceded that some behavior
(such as reflexive behavior) is not goal directed (Locke,
1968).

Therefore, although not recognized as such by Locke,

the theoretical foundation of goal setting is a tautology.
Goal-directed, purposive behavior must be related to goals
or else it would not be goal directed behavior (Locke,
1969).
The original goal setting tautology hypothesized a
relationship between an individual's goal (IG) and
performance (P) or. behavior, not between assigned goals (AG)
and behavior.

Many of the experiments designed to test the

theory, however, did not test the relationship between
individual goals and performance, but, instead, tested the
relationship between assigned goals and performance (Bryan,

& Locke, 1967a, 1967b; Locke, 1966a, 1966b, 1967, 1968;
Locke & Bryan, 1966a, 1966b, 1967a, 1967b, 1968a, 1968b).
These models assume that IG = AG, and that P = f(AG).
The hypothesis that assigning difficult, specific goals
will increase performance has received considerable
empirical support.

The theory has been tested using a
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variety of laboratory tasks, such as brainstorming (Locke,
1966a), addition (Locke & Bryan, 1969), psychomotor tasks
(Locke & Bryan, 1966), driving a car (Locke & Bryan, 1969a),
figure selection (Bavelas, 1978), and chess (Campbell &
Ilgen, 1976), as well as a variety of field task such as
logging, clerical work, typing, computation, training,
machine servicing, truck loading, ship loading, die casting,
supervision, safety behavior, scientific and engineering
work, key punching, technical work, customer service,
assembly, telephone service work, writing, and various
management tasks (Locke et al., 1985).
Locke et al. (1981), conclude that in 99 of 110 goal
setting studies specific, hard goals led to higher
performance than medium, easy, do-your-best, or no goals.
Latham & Lee (1985) report that in 64 of 66 field studies
specific, challenging goals resulted in higher performance
than nonspecific goals, and that laboratory studies and
field studies produce similar results--lending credibility
to the use of laboratory studies in this particular area of
research.

Chidester and Grigsby (1984) concluded that,

"Unequivocally, setting either difficult or specific goals
reliably results in increased productivity."
The strong empirical support seems to have lead to the
implicit assumption that assigning goals will always improve
performance.

The problem with such a conclusion is that one

is lead to believe that the only action necessary to solve
motivation problems is to assign difficult, specific goals.
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Even worse, one could conclude that the more difficult the
assigned goals the better--even to the point of suggesting,
as some authors have (Garland, 1982; Garland, 1983; Locke,
1982) that it may be better to assign unattainable goals!
The Expectancy Theory Choice Model

The expectancy theory choice model's basic proposition
is that motivation is the result of choices individuals make
among alternative effort or performance levels.

If an

individual chooses to exert high effort over low effort,
he/she is more highly motivated.

Expectancy theory has also

received a number of positive reviews.

It has, for example,

been called "the dominant paradigm for research on workrelated motivation (Connolly, 1976)," and, "the most widely
accepted theory of work and motivation among today's
organizational psychologists" (Wahba, & House, 1974).

For

more extensive reviews of expectancy theory literature see
Campbell, & Pritchard, 1976; Connolly, 1976; Heneman &
Schwab, 1972; House & Wahba, 1972; Lawler, 1973; Mitchell,
1974; Mitchell, 1979; Mitchell, 1982; Mitchell & Biglan,
1971; Schwab et al., 1979; Wahba & House, 1974.
Although constructs and hypothesis similar to those in
expectancy theory can be found in the work of motivation
theorist such as Georgopolous, Mahoney, and Jones (1957);
Lewin (1935); and Tolman (1932), most recent interest in
expectancy theory stems from Vroom's 1964 book Work and
Motivation.

Vroom assumes that behavior is the result of

choices among alternative courses of action, and that
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choices are lawfully related to psychological events
occurring contemporaneously with the behavior described.

It

is a cognitive model similar to models developed by Atkinson
(1958); Davidson, Suppes, and Siegel (1957); Lewin (1938);
Peak (1955); Rotter (1955); and Tolman (1959) (Vroom, 1964,
p. 14).

Vroom•s model has three constructs:

valences,

expectancies, and instrumentalities.
Valences.

Valences are defined as affective

orientations toward particular outcomes.

The term "valence"

is similar to the terms "incentive" (Atkinson, 1958b),
"attitude" (Peak, 1955), and "expected utility" (Edwards,
1954) (Vroom, 1964, p. 15).

While distinguishing between

values and valences on the basis of anticipated satisfaction
(valence) versus experienced satisfaction (value), Vroom
discusses valences in much the same way Rokeach (1973)
discusses values.

Some outcomes have value in and of

themselves (what Rokeach would call terminal values), while
other outcomes have value only because they lead to other
desired outcomes (Rokeach's instrumental values).
While Vroom offers no explanation as to how terminal
outcomes acquire their valence, the valence of an
instrumental outcome is a monotonically increasing function
of the algebraic sum of the products of the valences of all
other outcomes and the instrumentality of the outcome for
the attainment of these other outcomes (Vroom, 1964, p.
17) .
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VALENCE MODEL
n
VJ = fJ

[ I:

(VkIJk) ]

k=l
where:
j = 1. .• n;

vj
Ijk

fJ'>O;

iIJJ=O

= the valence of outcome j
= the cognized instrumentality

of outcome j
for the attainment of outcome k, and -1 .s, Ijk .s, 1.

Instrumentalities.

Instrumentalities are defined as

outcome-outcome associations which can range from -1
(outcome j is certain without outcome k and impossible with
it) to +1 (outcome j is a sufficient and necessary condition
for the attainment of outcome k)

(Vroom, 1964, p. 18).

Vroom (1964, p. 18) states that the valence model is useful
in understanding preferences, but is not able to predict
choices.

To predict choices a third construct,

expectancies, is introduced.
Expectancies.

Expectancies are defined as act-outcome

subjective beliefs or probabilities similar to what Tolman
(1959), Rotter (1955), Atkinson (1958b) call expectancies
and what Edwards (1954), Davidson et al. (1957) call
subjective probabilities (Vroom, 1964, p. 17).

These

expectancies reflect an individuals beliefs about the
consequents of behavior alternatives.

The combination of

expectancies and valences results in a force model often
referred to as the "expectancy model."
The expectancy model, or force model, is a descendant
of force models such as Tolman's performance vector (1959),
Atkinson's aroused motivation (1958b), Luce's subjective
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expected utility (1962), and Rotter's behavior potential
(1955) (Vroom, 1964, p. 18).

The basic proposition is that

the force on a person to perform an act is a
monotonically increasing function of the algebraic
sum of the products of the valences of all
outcomes and the strength of his expectancies that
the act will be followed by the attainment of
these outcomes (Vroom, 1964, p.18)
FORCE MODEL

Fi

=

n
f1 [ ~ (EijVj)]

j=l

(i

= n+l. •. m)

where:
Fi = the force to perform act i.
E1 j = the strength of the expectancy (O~E 1 j~l) that
act i will be followed by outcome j.
Vj =the valence of outcome j.
People choose from among alternative acts the one with the
strongest positive (or weakest negative) force (Vroom, 1964,
p. 19).

The only assumption about rationality is that of

subjective rationality (Vroom, 1964, p. 18).

Given a choice

among effort levels, Vroom's model predicts that an
individual with the motivation force scores (MFS) in Figure
1 would choose to work at goal level four.
Very few studies have used a choice model to predict
effort.

Kennedy et al. (1983) predicted the time spent by

students on various activities--studies, athletics, social
activities, spiritual activities, service toward others, and
leisure.

They obtained MFS scores for each of five effort

levels for each activity, then used the motivational scores
to predict the effort level the subject would choose.
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The model predicted that the students would spend more hours
on each activity than was actually spent.
In summary, in the expectancy choice model goal is the
sole determinant of effort, and goal is equal to the point
where the first derivative of the utility function (the
slope) is equal to zero--the maximum point of the utility
curve.

Apparently it is assumed that the utility function

is quadratic, since a linear utility function would predict
that everyone would have the same goal (see Figure 1).
The Expectancy Theory Force Model

Although the discussion thus far has presented
expectancy theory as a within-subjects decision model, until
1974 virtually all of the tests used a between-subjects
design (Mitchell, 1974).

In such designs, differences in

the magnitude of individuals expectancies, valences, or
motivational force for a single alternative were used to
explain motivational differences in individuals performance.
Galbraith and Cummings (1967), for example, tested a model
which included an intrinsic outcome (ego involvement) as
well as a variety of extrinsic outcomes (such as being
popular with coworkers, a pay increase, support and
consideration of supervisor, promotion, and fringe
benefits).

Effort and performance were assumed to be

perfectly correlated and expectancies were not measured; the
instrumentality and valence measures were dummy coded and
used as predictors of performance (measured as the average
monthly percentage of standard) .
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Figure 1
Effort Utility curve Example
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The only significant predictor was an interaction term which
contained the instrumentality and valence of supervisor
support and consideration.
Lawler and Porter (1967) also assume a high correlation
between effort and performance.

While they measured the

probability that effort would lead to certain outcomes (a
measure of expectancy) as well as the probability that high
productivity or high performance would lead to these
outcomes (a measure of instrumentality) they ended up
combining them into one index.

While valences times

expectancies predicted better than valences or expectancies
alone, providing some support for expectancy theory, the
correlation between instrumentality and effort was only .11
and the correlation between instrumentality and performance
was only .18.

The proposed interaction between role

perceptions and motivation was not supported.
Lawler (1968) did one of the few longitudinal studies
in expectancy theory research.

Two measures, one year

apart, were obtained for performance and instrumentalityvalence.

The cross-lagged correlations indicated that the

instrumentality-valence effect on performance was stronger
than the performance effect on instrumentality-valence.
Hackman and Porter (1968) examined the relationship between
instrumentality and performance, valence and performance,
and instrumentality times valence and performance.

The

multiplication of instrumentality and valence yielded higher
correlations than any of the other possible combinations.
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Porter and Lawler (1968) used the same measures used by
Lawler and Porter (1967).

Both instrumentalities and role

perceptions were significant predictors of performance, but
the interaction terms were not significant.
Problems with the Goal, Choice, and Force Models
As was pointed out in Chapter 1, any one of the
theories alone has inherent weaknesses.

Goal setting alone

is unable to explain why a person chooses one goal but not
another, and is incapable of explaining why individuals with
the same goal, the same ability, and the same constraints
exert different amounts of effort.

The expectancy theory

force model is capable of explaining why individuals with
the same goal would exert different amounts of effort, but
is unable to explain goal choice.

The expectancy choice

model is capable of explaining the choice among performance
goals, but is incapable of explaining why an increase in the
magnitude of a reward would increase motivation.
The differences in these models can be illustrated by
using the example of two individuals (Il and !2) faced with
a choice of performance goals (see Figure 2).

A goal choice

model predicts that both individuals will choose the same
goal (medium performance).

Because they have the same goal,

both the goal setting model and the expectancy choice model
predict that they will exert the same amount of effort
In the goal setting and expectancy choice models the
magnitude of the utility is irrelevant.

Even though the

medium goal level has much higher utility for !2 than for
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Il, these models predict that both individuals will exert
the same amount of effort.
Thus an individual offered $1 for completing a task,
and nothing if isn't completed, would be just as motivated
as the person offered $1,000,000 for completing the task and
nothing if it isn't completed, a theoretical prediction
vastly at odds with common sense and experience.

On the

other hand, a motivational force model would predict that !2
would exert more effort than Il even though they both have
the same goal, because the magnitude of the motivational
force (expected value) is greater.
Existing Views of the Relationship Among the Theories
Opinions about the relationship between expectancy
theory and goal setting theory range from one extreme, where
theorist argue that the theories are complementary and
should be integrated, to the other extreme where the
theories are believed to be contradictory.

One of the

reasons such different conclusions have been reached is that
theorist have failed to distinguish beteen expectancy theory
choice models and expectancy theory force models.

If the

distinction between the choice and force models are
recognized, it can be seen that those theorist who believe
the theories to be complementary are talking about the
expectancy choice model and the goal setting model, while
those theorist who believe the theories to be contradictory
are talking about the expectancy force model and the goal
setting

model.
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Figure 2
Difference Between the Goal Choice & Goal Force Models
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Theories as Complementary

Because the goal setting theory's major weakness is its
inability to explain goal choice (Latham & Yukl, 1975), and
because the expectancy theory choice model is formulated as
an internal decision making model (House et al., 1974),
theorist have argued that expectancy theory is a logical
complement to goal setting theory (Campbell, Dunnette et
al., 1970; Daehler & Mobley, 1973; Erez et al., 1985; Erez
and Kanfer, 1983; Evans, 1986; Garland, 1985; Latham & Yukl,
1975; Locke, 1968; Locke et al., 1984; Locke et al., 1986;
Motowidlo et al., 1978; Naylor & Ilgen, 1984; and Steers &
Porter, 1974).
Daehler & Mobley•s model.

The earliest attempt to

integrate expectancy theory and goal setting, was the work
of Campbell et al. (1970).

Task goals were introduced as an

additional expectancy theory construct, but they did not
specify the nature of the relationship between expectancies,
valences, and goals.

In 1973, Daehler & Mobley, using the

earlier theoretical model of Campbell et al. (1970), were
the first to use formulations similar to Vroom's to predict
performance goal choice.

In their model an individual faced

with a choice among goal levels is predicted to choose the
goal level with the highest expected utility (EU).

The

expected utility of a goal is obtained by multiplying the
expectancy that a.given alternative is attainable (E) times
the expected value of that alternative (EV).
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Based on their description, the formula would be:
EUs

=

Es X EVs.

E is a function of situational restraints

(SR) and ability (A).

The expected value of each

alternative is the sum of the products obtained by
multiplying the probability that an outcome will result from
accomplishing a given goal (E2) times the valence (V) of the
outcome.

Their description would result in the following

formula (they apparently assumed the valence of a given
outcome (j) is constant across all levels of G).
EVs =

n
~

(E2gj

j=l

*

Vj)

E2 is a function of rewards and punishments (RP) .
Rewards and punishments (RP) are a function of past
performance.

The goal with the highest expected utility

then becomes the individual's goal.
the individual's goal.

Effort is a function of

Finally, performance (P) is a

function of effort, ability, and situational restraints.
The integration of goal setting and expectancy theory
is achieved by assuming that choice among effort levels
(hypothesized by Vroom) is the equivalent to a choice among
performance goal levels, as Figure 3 illustrates.

The

theory predicts that individual One (Il) will choose goal
level 1, while individual Two (I2) will choose goal level 2.
As a result of the higher goal, I2 will exert higher effort
and, assuming ability and no environmental restraints,
perform at a higher level.
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Fiqure 3

The Goal Choice Model as the Determinant of Goal Level
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Daehler and Mobley's integrated model was tested in two
different plants.

In Plant 1 the correlations between

predicted goals and actual goals, and between goals and
performance were significant, but the correlations were
generally low (.30 or below).

In Plant 2 the relationship

between predicted goals and actual goals were also
significant (with correlations again around .30), but the
correlations between goals and performance were generally
either not significant or very low (.16 or lower).

As a

result, the tests were not conclusive.
Evan•s model.

Evan (1986) has also proposed a model to

use expectancy theory to predict goal choice where

Ma .. n are the motivational forces associated with
goals a .. n;
IVAa .. n is the anticipated satisfaction associated
with working at a level so as to achieve goals
a .. n;

Eia .. n is the expectancy or perceived probability
that the individual can attain goal a .. n;
IVBa .. n is the anticipated satisfaction that the
individual expects to gain from attaining goals
a •. n;
EVj are the anticipated satisfactions associated
with extrinsic rewards (compensation, promotion,
time off, etc.); and
E2aj is the set of probabilities that extrinsic
reward j will follow as a consequence of achieving
goal a.
He argues that when faced with a choice among goals, an
individual will choose the goal with the highest
motivational force (M8 ) .
empirically tested.

So far Evan's model has not been

The causal order assumed by Daehler &

Mobley (1973) and Evans (1986) is:
Goal Assignment-->Goal Choice-->Goal-->Effort-->Performance
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Theories as Contradictory
The goal setting model vs. the expectancy force model.

It has also been argued that the theories are mutually
exclusive, contradictory, explanations of motivation,. which
means the theories cannot be integrated (Mento et al., 1980;
and Motowidlo et al., 1978.

These authors reach their

conclusions by comparing the predictions made by the goal
setting model with predictions derived from the expectancy
force model.

They begin with two propositions.

The first

is that goal setting hypothesizes a positive, linear
relationship between an individual's goal (GL) and
performance (PL).

The second is that the expectancy force

theory hypothesizes a positive, linear relationship between
expected utility (EU) and performance.

Valences and

expectancies are assumed to be independent.

They argue that

because an increase in goal level should decrease the
probability of success, and expectancy theory multiplies
valence and the probability of success to calculate
motivational force, if valences remain constant decreasing
probabilities of success would result in lower motivation
and lower performance (Motowidlo et al., 1978).
The authors conclude that expectancy theory would
predict a negative linear relationship between goal level
and performance--the opposite of the prediction made by goal
setting.
Even though these researchers do not differentiate
between the expectancy choice and the expectancy force
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models, the perceived conflict must be between the goal
setting model and the expectancy force, or·what some
researchers (Kennedy et al., 1983), have labeled a singlealternative expectancy model.

The model is an expectancy

force model because expectancies and valences were measured
with respect to only one goal--the individual's assigned
goal.

Performance or effort was correlated with either

expectancy, valence, or expectancy

*

valence.

There is no

conflict with an expectancy choice model because the
expectancy choice model makes no predictions about the
consequences of increasing or decreasing the expected
utility of any specific act, but only make predictions based
on the relative attractiveness among acts.
Atkinson {1957), who explicitly assumes that
expectancies and valences are not independent, but, instead,
expectancies determine the degree to which individuals
experience intrinsic satisfaction from goal achievement, has
also used an expectancy force model to reach a conclusion
contradictory to the goal model.

Atkinson {1957) theorized,

and provided empirical support for (Atkinson, 1958a, 1958b),
a curvilinear relationship between goal level and
performance.

Atkinson's achievement theory assumes that

when no extrinsic outcomes are present the strength of the
motivation toward an act is equal to the motivation to
achieve success (Ms) minus the motivation to avoid failure
(Mr).

Ms is equal to the probability of success (P5 ) times

the incentive value of success.

The incentive value of
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success is equal to (l-P5 ) .

Mf is equal to the probability

of failure (Pf) times the incentive value of failure.
incentive value of failure is equal to -(1-Pf).

The

If M5 is

greater than Mf, and if one assumes that performance is a
function of the strength of motivation to perform an act,
then the relationship between goal level and performance
would be curvilinear with maximum performance occurring when
the probability of success is .5-a moderately difficult goal
level.
Attempts to resolve the conflict empirically (Arvey,
1972; Motowidlo et al., 1978; Mento et al., 1980) were
inconclusive with the first two studies interpreted as
supporting expectancy theory or achievement theory, while
the results in the third study were interpreted as
supporting goal setting.
The expectancy choice model vs the expectancy force
model.

Reviewers have also criticized the expectancy

motivational force model as an unacceptable
operationalization of expectancy theory (Connolly, 1976;
Heneman & Schwab, 1972; House & Wahba, 1972; Mitchell, 1974;
Mitchell, 1979; Mitchell, 1982; Mitchell & Biglan, 1971;
Wahba & House, 1974).

They view the expectancy force model

as contradictory to the expectancy choice model because
tests of the motivational force model have used a betweensubjects design even though, according to these researchers,
Vroom's model requires a within-subjects design.
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In addition to its theoretical correctness, at least
two other reasons have been offered for preferring a withinsubjects test of the theory.

First, ·individual differences

(which could produce theory error in between-subjects test)
are not relevant in within-subject designs (Kopelman, 1979).
Second, the lack of ratio level data (which make tests
between subjects difficult) (Schmidt, 1973) is not a problem
for within-subject designs because within-subject designs do
not require ratio level measurement (Ilgen, Nebeker, &
Pritchard, 1981).
Addition of the goal acceptance/goal commitment
constructs.

If the existing theories are contradictory,

problems with existing theories (such as obtaining a nonlinear relationship between assigned goals and performance)
must be overcome by the addition of new constructs.

While

new constructs have been added to both goal setting and
expectancy theory (see Miller & Grush, 1988, for an example
of constructs added to expectancy theory) two constructs
(goal acceptance and goal commitment) added by goal setting
researchers are most directly related to the integrated
theory being developed here, and are the only additional
constructs considered.
One explanation offered for the nonlinear relationship
between assigned goals and performance is that individuals
do not always accept assigned goals (Erez & Kanfer, 1983),
or are not committed to the goal (Locke et al., 1981).

The

simple linear relationship between goal difficulty and
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performance can only be asserted if goal acceptance is
assumed (Locke et al.., 1981).
Locke (1968) contains one of the first models which
attempts to integrate the goal acceptance/goal commitment
constructs into the goal setting model.

In this model:

Environmental Event -> Cognition -> Evaluation -> Goal
Setting -> Performance.
Goal assignment can be interpreted as an environmental
event which would trigger cognition, evaluation, and
ultimately individual goals.

While the importance of goal

acceptance and goal commitment is recognized, no attempt is
made to identify the specific determinants or processes
affecting these variables.

It is hypothesized that monetary

rewards and other incentives primarily affect the acceptance
of assigned goals, but no attempt is made to specify
precisely how.
In an article by Locke, Cartledge, and Knerr (1970) the
1968 model is expanded to:
Existents -> Cognition -> Affective Reaction -> Goal Setting
-> Actions

As the result of evidence presented in the article, the
evaluation stage is hypothesized to include anticipated
incentives or outcomes, and the affective stage is expanded
to include anticipatory emotions and desires (the judged
instrumentality of anticipated goals).

When assigned a goal

the individual makes a choice to attempt the assigned goal
level, or some other level.

The willingness to accept a

goal would be a function of the extent to which the expected
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outcomes of goal achievement are desired outcomes.
specific directions are given

No

for predicting goal choice,

and no empirical test of the goal choice model is provided.
Erez et al. (1983) hypothesize that goal assignment is
the initiator of goal choice.

They frame the choice as one

of choosing to accept or not accept the goal, and propose
that individuals will choose a goal if the expected utility
of choosing the goal is higher than the expected utility of
not choosing the goal.

They do not specify a precise

formula for calculating the expected utility of accepting or
not accepting a

~oal.

Participation in goal setting is

viewed as one strategy for gaining goal acceptance.
Although Erez, Early, and Hulin (1985) provide empirical
evidence which supports the participation hypothesis, they
do not test the hypothesis that goal acceptance can be
predicted by using the expected utility of goal acceptance
and goal rejection.
The introduction of additional goal constructs, such as
goal acceptance and goal commitment, led to a new set of
problems.

Goal setting theory offers no explanation as to

what determines goal acceptance or goal commitment (Locke et
al., 1988).

If the determinants of goal acceptance and goal

commitment are not clearly specified, predictions about goal
acceptance and commitment cannot be made, and goal setting
theory becomes untestable. To quote Latham and Yukl (1975)
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the greatest deficiency of Locke's theory is the
failure to specify the determinants of goal
acceptance and goal commitment.

(p. 841)

Consequently, a great deal of recent research has
focused on the development of the goal acceptance/goal
commitment constructs (e.g. Hollenbeck & Klein, 1987; Leifer
& McGannon, 1986; Locke et al., 1988).

Locke et al. (1988)

recently proposed that goal commitment is the result of
certain cognitive processes which are influenced by external
factors (such as authority and external rewards and
incentives), interactive factors (participation), and
internal factors (expectancy, self-efficacy, and internal
rewards).

Hollenbeck and Klein (1987) propose that the two

major determinants of goal commitment are the attractiveness
of goal attainment and the expectancy of goal attainment,
and that attractiveness and expectancy are determined by
various situational and individual variables.

While they

have tested the relationship between some of the individual
measures and goal commitment (Hollenbeck & Brief, 1987;
Hollenbeck & Williams, 1987), they have not directly tested
the relationship between attractiveness or expectancy and
goal commitment.
Problems with goal acceptance/goal commitment.

There

are several problems with the existing state of development
of the goal commitment/goal acceptance constructs.

One is

that none of the theories provide a specific, testable
hypothesis about how cognitive processes involving
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variables such as expectations or attractiveness determine
goal acceptance/goal commitment.

Second, none of the models

have any empirical support for the linkage between
expectations/attractiveness and goal commitment.
Also, even though a review of the recent conceptual
work in goal commitment indicates that the determinants
being proposed for goal commitment are in fact the same
variables which have traditionally been used in expectancy
models, no attempt has been made to compare the goal
acceptance/goal commitment constructs with constructs or
processes which already exist in expectancy theory such as
goal choice or motivational force.

Before continuing the

development of new constructs it is important to question
critically whether the theories are really in conflict, and
whether goal acceptance/goal commitment are really new
constructs or are simply new names for existing constructs.
If the theories are not contradictory, and the goal
acceptance/goal commitment constructs can be explained with
existing expectancy theories, it would be preferable to use
existing theories rather than continue the development of
new theories.

Such an approach would be more parsimonious

and would have the advantage of utilizing the body of
knowledge associated with existing theories.

One problem

with making such an evaluation is that, at the moment, there
is no consensus as to how the terms should be.defined, or
even whether goal acceptance and goal commitment are two
different constructs or are the same construct.
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Locke et al. (1988) define goal commitment as "the
attachment to or determination to reach a goal," and assume
that goal acceptance is a special case of the more general
goal commitment construct (the attachment to an assigned
goal).

In an earlier paper Locke et al. (1981) define goal

commitment as the determination to keep trying for a goal,
and goal acceptance as the extent to which one is committed
to an assigned goal.

The authors state that goal acceptance

and goal commitment can vary independently--even though
acceptance is defined in terms of commitment!

Hollenbeck

and Klein (1987) conclude that while commitment to difficult
goals should be distinguished from acceptance of difficult
goals, goal acceptance and goal commitment will be treated
as a single construct (goal commitment) because there is
considerable overlap between the two and because goal
acceptance/goal commitment have been used interchangeably in
previous research.

Leifer and McGannon (1986) and Naylor &

Ilgen (1984), on the other hand, view goal acceptance and
goal commitment as conceptually and, in the case of Leifer
and McGannon, empirically different constructs (Leifer &
McGannon's factor analysis produced independent factors for
goal acceptance and goal commitment).
The literature reviewed thus far indicates a great deal
of confusion exists over whether the goal acceptance and
goal commitment constructs are the same or different, how
they should be predicted, or how they are related to the
expectancy choice or expectancy force model.
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An Inteqrated Model
A recent development in goal setting research offers an
insight which can be used to resolve the perceived conflict
between the goal setting and expectancy force model, the
perceived conflict between the expectancy choice and the
expectancy force model, and the ambiguity and confusion over
the goal acceptance/goal commitment constructs.

Garland

(1984) and Locke et al. {1986) observed that even when
ability is controlled there are two types of performance
variance:

variance between assigned goal levels, and

variance within assigned goal levels.

Each of these two

types of variance requires a different type of explanation.
variance Between Goal Levels
An integrated goal setting/expectancy choice model can
explain the variance in effort between groups assigned
different goal levels.

This model attributes the

differences in effort to differences in goals:

individuals

assigned hard goals have chosen to pursue more difficult
goals than individuals assigned easy goals.

This model is

based on the assumption that a cognitive decision making
process occurs between goal assignment and individual goal
formation (Erez et al., 1983; Locke, 1968; Locke et al.,
1970).

The models of Evans (1986), Daehler & Mobley (1973),

and Vroom (1964) discussed earlier specify the constructs
involved in the cognitive decision making process, and
provide specific, testable hypotheses about how the decision
will be made.
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Inteqrated Goal Choice Model

Assigned
-->

Goal

Expectancy
Choice
Model

Individual
--> Effort

-->

Goal

For this model to be valid goal assignment must affect
individual goal choice by affecting either expectancies, or
valences.

Naylor and Ilgen (1984) proposed that the primary

effect of goal assignment is on the product-to-evaluation
contingency function (the function which describes an
individual's beliefs about how various performance levels
will be evaluated, and subsequently rewarded) .

For example,

money and other incentives would influence goal choice by
making high goal levels more attractive than low goal
levels.

This hypothesis has not been tested.

Matusi et al.

(1981) do provide some evidence consistent with Garland's
hypothesis.

They demonstrated that (contrary to Atkinson's

assumption of decreasing valences at high goal levels) an
increase in goal level may result in an increase in the
intrinsic satisfaction of goal achievement.
Garland (1985) views goal assignment as a form of
social influence.

He argures that people use assigned goals

as a source of information about the expectations of goal
assignors, as well as the probability of successful
performing at various goal levels.
He proposes that 1) performance valence is a negative
function of assigned task goals and performance expectancy,
and 2) performance expectancy is a positive function of
assigned task goal and ability.

The performance valence
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term is the sum of the valence of reaching each of several
goal levels.

The performance expectancy term is the sum of

the probability of reaching at least each of several goal
levels and is the same as what Bandura, 1977; Locke et al.,
1984; and Locke et al., 1986 have called self-efficacy.
Garland reasons that when an individual has been
assigned a goal he/she will believe that in order to receive
a positive evaluation from the person assigning the goal,
performance will have to be at the assigned level or higher.
Therefore, goal levels lower than the assigned goal level
will have less valence than goal levels equal to, or greater
than, the assigned goal level.

For example, if there are

three possible goal levels, ranging from easy (1) to hard
(3), and if individual A has been assigned goal level 2
while individual B has been assigned goal level 3, both
levels 2 and 3 would have positive valence for individual A,
while only level 3 would have positive valence for
individual B.

This means that individual B would have a

higher goal, but a lower summed valence (a negative
correlation between the summed valences and goals) .
The positive relationship between assigned goals and
performance expectancies is based on the assumption that an
individual will believe that it must be possible to achieve
an assigned goal, or authority figures (supervisors,
experimenters, etc.) would not have assigned the goal.

Goal

assignment will cause an individual assigned a hard goal to
believe the probability of reaching any given goal level is
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higher than will an individual assigned an easy goal.

For

example if indiviudal A is assigned a difficult goal
level (3) while individual B is assigned an· easy goal
level (1) then, according to Garland, individual A will
reason that it must be possible to perform a level 3, or the
goal would not have been assigned.

individual B, on the

other hand, will believe that goal level 3 must be
impossible or they would have been assigned goal level 3
instead of goal level 2.

Consequently, Garland predicts

that individual A will assign a higher probability of
success to each of the goal levels than will individual B.
Hypotheses 1-4 summarize these arguments.
HlA:

If a goal level (G) is assigned, then the

intrinsic satisfaction of achieving the assigned
goal level G will be higher than the intrinsic
satisfaction of achieving goal levels lower than
the assigned goal level (Naylor & Ilgen, 1984).
HlB:

The summed valence of reaching each of all

possible goal levels will be higher in the
moderate goal condition than in the hard goal
condition (Garland, 1985).
H2:

Subjects in the hard goal condition will

assign a higher subjective probability to
achieving a given goal level (G) than the
subjective probability assigned to the same goal
level by subjects in the moderate goal condition.
(Garland, 1985).
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The third hypothesis tests the ability of the expectancy
choice portion of the model to predict goal choice.
H3:

If faced with a choice among goal levels,

then the individual will choose the goal level
with the highest expected value.
Hypothesis four test the relationship between the unified
model and goal acceptance.
H4:

If the difference between an individual's

goal and assigned goal decreases, then goal
acceptance will increase.
Variance Within a Goal Level
Variance due to goal acceptance.

The variance in

effort within a goal group could be due to the fact that an
individual has chosen to pursue a different goal than the
one assigned (lack of goal acceptance).

Using goal

acceptance to explain the within-group variance results in
exactly the same model (the goal choice model) just used to
explain between group variance.

Erez et al. (1983) have

proposed that when individuals are assigned goals, the
decision is whether or not to accept the assigned goal.

The

problem with their explanation is that they have lumped all
goals other than the assigned goal into the goal rejection
option.

Therefore, the model is incapable of predicting

which goal the individual will choose if he/she does not
accept the assigned goal.

The problem can be resolved if the decision to accept
or not to accept a goal is recognized as a special case of
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the more general expectancy goal choice model.

The

expectancy choice model can be used on a within-subjects
basis to predict the goal the individual will choose.

Goal

acceptance would be defined as the difference between the
individual's goal and the assigned goal (Hannan, 1975;
Naylor & Ilgen, 1984).

This approach has the advantage of

defining and measuring goal acceptance very specifically,
and specifying the relationship between goal acceptance and
the expectancy choice model.

It also allows goal acceptance

to be predicted on an a priori basis.
Researchers have relied exclusively on differences in
individual goals to explain variation in performance within
a goal group.

Garland (1984) hypothesizes that, within a

group with the same assigned goal level, the probability of
success and performance tend to be positively related and he
argures that performance increases because an increase in
the probability of success has results in higher individual
goals and subsequently higher performance.

Both Garland

(1984) and Locke et al. (1984) report empirical results
consistent with this hypothesis.

Locke et al. (1984) tested

a model which hypothesized that self-efficacy would be
positively related to goals, which in turn would be
positively related to performance.

They also proposed a

direct, positive relationship between self-efficacy and
performance.

Both the path coefficient between self-

efficacy and goals, and the path coefficient between selfefficacy and performance were significant.

The authors'
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explanation is that a higher self-efficacy score indicates
higher probabilities of success at higher goal

l~vels

which

results in more difficult goals being set and therefore
higher performance.

Hypothesizing that probabilities (or

self-efficacy) affect performance through their effect on
individual goals is consistent with the significant
relationship between self-efficacy and goals and the
significant relationship between goals and performance.

The

hypothesis, however, does not explain the significant
relationship between self-efficacy and performance.

A

significant relationship between self-efficacy and
performance (with the influence of goals on performance
already accounted for) would require variance in performance
which is not due to differences in individual goals.
variance due to goal commitment.

If the within group

variance is not due to differences in individual goals, what
is it due to?

The most likely explanation is that even

though individuals have the same goal, they vary in their
commitment to the goal.

Although two individuals have the

same goal, one may be much more willing to exert effort
toward achieving the goal than the other (Naylor & Ilgen,
1984).

Using goal commitment to explain the performance

variance, however, does little good unless one can also
explain the variance in commitment.
Fortunately, such an explanation already exists.

As

was discussed earlier, the central hypothesis of the
expectancy force model is that changes in motivational force
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(expected utility) result in variance in effort--even when
individuals have the same goal.

It seems reasonable to

believe that the reason an increases in the expected value
of goal achievement results in increased effort is because
it increases commitment to the goal.

An individual offered

one million dollars for producing ten widgets should be more
committed to producing 10 widgets than the individual
offered one dollar for producing 10 widgets.

This

hypothesis is consistent with Bandura, from whom Locke et
al. (1986) and Garland (1985) have borrowed the concept of
self-efficacy.

Even though Bandura never included the

incentive value of a goal in empirical tests of his
theories, he includes the incentive value of the goal in his
theory as one of the determinants of effort (Bandura, 1977).
This would mean that a change in valences or a change
in expectancies may have two effects.

One would be to

change an individual's goal by affecting goal choice.

The

other would be to change an individual's commitment to a
goal by increasing the expected utility of goal achievement.
Integrated Goal Commitment Model
Assigned
-->

Goal

Expectancy
Force
Model

Goal
-->

->

Effort

Commitment

This suggests that the performance variance within a
group with the same assigned goal observed by Garland (1984)
and Locke et al. (1984) may not be the result of differences
in individual goals, but, instead, may be caused by
differences in the expected value of goal achievement.

Such

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

50

a hypothesis is consistent with their observation that
increases in the probability of success within a goal group
were associated with increases in performance.
example illustrated in Figures 4 and 5.

Consider the

(Assume the

valences of not reaching a particular goal level to be zero.
Locke et al. (1986) implicitly make the same assumption.)
As the example in Figures 4 and 5 illustrate, it is the
utility of the goal which is changing as self-efficacy
changes, not the goal level (both individuals would choose
goal level 4).

While the specific numbers used in the

example can be questioned, they do contain several
characteristics which make them consistent with the
hypotheses discussed thus far.

The example is consistent

with empirical results obtained by Matusi et al. (1981)
because the valences increase as goal level increases; the
probabilities are decreasing across goal levels as Motowidlo
et al. (1978) and Mento et al. (1980) suggest, and the selfefficacy scores are consistent with Locke et al. (1984);
Locke et al. (1986).

The example is also consistent with

empirical tests of single force models which have found the
motivation force score to be a significant predictor of
effort (Schwab et al., 1979)--even when the within-subject
goal choice has been taken into account (Daehler & Mobley,
1973; Kennedy et al. 1983).
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Fiqure 4
Example of Changes in Probabilities Which Change Force but
Not Goals

Goal Level

low

Probability

Valence*

Individual
A
B

Individual
A
B

1

.7

.8

2
3
4
5
6

.6
.5
.4
.3
.2

.7
.6
.5
.4
•3

~

~

high 7
Self-Efficacy

2.8

2
4
6

2
4
6

8

8

10
12
14

10
12
14

Ex12ected
Value
Individual
A
B
1.4
2.4
3.0
3.2
3.0
2.4
1.4

1. 6
2.8
3.6
4.0
4.0
3.6
2.8

3.5

The numbers in the example result in the following utility
curves.
* even if Atkinson's assumption of decreasing valences were
used the conclusions would not change
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Figure

s

utility curve for the Example in Figure 4

EV
I

41

I

31

B

I

21

I
ii
I
II

B
A

B
A

B
B
B

A
A

A

B
A

1

A

2

3

4

5

6

7

GL

EV = Expected value
Goal level
GL
Individual A
A
B = Individual B
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In Daehler & Mobley's study, in Plant 2 both the
correlation between the predicted goal level and performance
(.12) and the correlation between maximum expected utility
and performance (.18) were significant.

The results are

consistent with both a goal choice and motivational force
model.

The approach used to obtain the motivational force

scores in this study is different from the approach used in
other between-subjects expectancy models in that they do not
obtain force scores for an arbitrarily choosen

goal level

(such as high performance) but, instead, use the MFS
calculated for the individual's predicted or stated goal
level.

This approach provides a theoretical justification

for the goal level used.

This theoretical justification is

lacking in previous between subjects models and will be used
in this study.
Kennedy et al. (1983) compared a within-subject model
with a between-subjects model, and a force, choice, and
difference model.

The results indicate that the choice and

the difference models yield significantly higher
correlations than the single alternative model, but the
correlations for the single alternative model were
significant.
The recognition that differences in effort may be due
to either differences in goals or due to differences in the
commitment to a

goa~

also removes the only remaining

obstacle to integrating all three theories--the perceived
conflict between the expectancy theory choice model and the
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expectancy theory force model.

Instead of being in

conflict, each theory is explaining a different type of
variance.

The choice model is explaining goal choice which

in turn explains differences in effort due to differences in
goals.

The force model is explaining the motivational force

toward a goal which in turn explains the variance in the
amount of effort exerted to achieve a goal.

This would

indicate that the force model is not just an inadequate
operationalization of the choice model as indicated by some
reviewers, but is a different conceptualization of the
theory, one which recognizes the importance of the force
toward a goal, not just the relative difference in force
between goals.

It would also indicate that the choice model

and the force model are not contradictory, as the previous
research reviewed would indicate, but are complementary.
Although previous research has not explicity recognized
the conceptual relationship between the expectancy force
model and the expectancy choice model proposed here, the
idea that effort may change even though the performance goal
has not changed can be seen in the writing of earlier
theorticians.

Vroom (1964), for example, clearly viewed the

product of expectancies and valences as producing a "force"
on an individual to act.

To capture this conceptualization

he used the term "motivational force score" to refer to the
product of the expectancies and valences instead of more
commonly used decision science terms such as "expected
value" or "expected utility."

Vroom (1964, p. 263) states
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other things being equal, we would expect the
performance of workers to increase as the valence
of effective performance increases.
Locke et al. (1981) state that one way incentives affect
performance is to
arouse the willingness to expend more effort to
attain a given objective than not offering money
[incentives].
This would explain why in some studies (such as Terborg,
1976) money has had an effect on performance independent of
its effect on goal level.
The notion that effort varies with the strength of the
expected utility of goal achievement is similar to earlier
psychological theories of motivation.

For example, need

theories (i.e. Maslow, 1954) which developed apart from the
decision science models such as Edwards, (1954) that Vroom
relied on in formulating his version of expectancy theory,
argue that the intensity of effort is a function of the
strength of the need.

Tolman's performance vector (1959),

Atkinson's aroused motivation (1958b), and Rotter's behavior
potential (1955) contain a similar conceptualization and are
similar to Vroom's conceptualization of motivational force
(Vroom, 1964, p. 18).

The integrated goal commitment model

results in the following hypotheses:
HS:

If the utility of a goal increases, then

commitment

toward the goal will

incr~ase.
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H6:

If commitment to a goal increases, then

effort toward the goal will increase.
H7:

If an individual's goal level increases, then

effort will increase.
Proposed Unified Theory

The literature reviewed suggests that while goal level
may be one explanation for differences in performance, goal
level alone is inadequate.

In addition to goals, the

magnitude of the expected value of goal achievement has a
direct effect on performance by increasing goal commitment.
This indicates that a within-subjects expectancy choice
model should be used to predict an individual's goal (and
subsequently goal acceptance), and an expectancy force model
should be used to predict goal commitment.

An integrated

model which contains both personal goals and goal commitment
should then be used to predict effort and performance.

The

result is a unified performance motivation theory which
integrates the goal setting, goal choice, and goal force
theories (see Figure 6).

Assigned goals are hypothesized to

affect both goal choice and the force toward a goal by
influencing the valence of goals and the probability of
achieving goals.

The expectancy choice model predicts the

individual's goal level, while the expectancy force model
predicts goal commitment.

The individual's goal level and

the individual's commitment to that goal level are
hypothesized to be the primary motivational determinants of
effort.

Effort, within the constraints of the environment
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and ability, predicts performance.

Ability and

environmental constraints are hypothesized to influence
choice by influencing an individual's perception of the
probability and valence of achieving various goal levels.
They are also hypothesized to directly influence effort and
performance, although these linkages are not tested in this
study.
The proposed theory is an improvement on existing
motivation theories because it explains both the choice and
intensity of behavior.

The proposed theory resolves the

existing confusion between goal acceptance and goal
commitment by making clear that motivational force and/or
goal commitment occurs with respect to a specific goal.

If

goal commitment is measured with respect to the assigned
goal, then goal acceptance and goal commitment are the same.
If goal commitment is measured with respect to the
individual's personal goal, then goal commitment and goal
acceptance are not the same.

As explained earlier, the

model also eliminates the perceived conflict between goal
setting and expectancy theory and between the expectancy
choice model and the expectancy force model.

The model

provides an explanation as to why an individual will choose
one performance goal level but not another, why an
individual will accept one assigned goal but not another, or
why individuals with the same goal level may exert different
amounts of effort.
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Figure 6
Unified Performance Motivation Model
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Alternative formulations.

Kennedy et al. (1983)

propose that not only may the magnitude of the motivational
force score affect effort, but the magnitude of the
difference between the MFS for high effort and the MFS for
low effort may affect effort.

The hypothesis is that the

greater the difference, the greater the motivation and
performance. If this model is correct, then not only may
goal level (the maximum point of the utility curve) and goal
utility (the height of the utility curve) affect effort, but
the slope of the utility curve may be important as well.
Tests which have compared the single-alternative model,
the choice model, and the difference model have concluded
that the choice and difference models outperform the single
force model, but the difference model performs as well or
better than the choice model (Kennedy et al. 1983).
Kopelman, Liebman, and Yukl (1978) tested what they referred
to as a return-on-effort model.

Return on effort was

operationalized as the difference between the expected value
of high effort and the expected value of low effort which
indicates that the return on effort model and the difference
model are the same.

The correlation between return-on-

effort and performance was higher than the correlation
between motivational force and performance.

The tests of

these models did not use a marginal test of significance (by
testing the increase in the significance of the model when
one of the constructs is added to a model which already
contains the other constructs).
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The first seven hypotheses derived from the unified
model test the various linkages in the model against a null
model.

For the unified model to be supported hypotheses 1-7

(particularly 3-7) should be supported.

If the unified

model is correct the immediate motivational determinants of
effort are goal level and goal commitment.

Therefore the

unified model should predict better than any single
construct (such as goals) and, adding additional
motivational variables (such as, assigned goal level, selfefficacy, summed valence, motivational force, or slope)
should not significantly improve the predictive ability of
the model.

The following hypotheses tests the unified model

against alternative formulations.
Hypothesis 8 test the unified model against the
traditional goal choice model.

support for this hypothesis

indicates support for the unified theory, rejection
indicates support for the traditional goal choice model.
HS:

Adding goal commitment to a model that

contains an individual's predicted goal (predicted
on a within-subject basis using the expectancy
choice model) will significantly improve the
predictive ability of the model.
H9:

Adding assigned goals to a model that

contains goal commitment and an individual's goal
will not significantly improve the predictive
ability of the model.
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Hypothesis 9 tests the unified model against the traditional
goal setting model,and Hypothesis 10 tests the unified
theory against the traditional expectancy force model.
H10:

Adding the motivational force score for high

performance to a model that contains an
individual's goal and goal commitment will not
significantly improve the model's

ability to

predict.
Hypothesis 11 test the unified theory against the
alternative formulations which use slope (return on effort)
(Kennedy et al., 1983; Kopelman et al., 1978).
H11:

Adding the slope of the utility curve to a

model that contains an individual's goal and goal
commitment, will not significantly increase the
model's ability to predict.
Hypotheses 12 and 13 tests the unified model against
models that use self-efficacy or summed valence measures
(i.e. Locke et al., 1986; Garland, 1985).
H12:

Adding self-efficacy to a model that

contains an individual's goal and goal commitment,
will not significantly increase the model's
ability to predict.
H13:

Adding summed valence to a model that

contains an individual's goal and goal commitment,
will not significantly increase the model's
ability to predict.
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The hypotheses tested in this dissertation improve on
existing tests in several ways.

First, they directly test

the effect of goal assignment on expectancies and valences
which has not been done.

Second, they test the ability of a

within-subject choice model to predict goal choice.

The

only other equivalent test was Daehler & Mobley (1973) which
was inconclusive.

Also, the relationship between

motivational force and commitment and between goal choice
and goal acceptance is tested (neither relationship has
previously been tested).

Finally, the predictive ability of

the unified model is tested against the expectancy choice
model, the expectancy force model, and the goal setting
model.

Previous research has only tested each model against

a null model, not with each other.
The findings should not only be of value to academics,
but practitioners as well, particularly in the design and
implementation of reward systems.

Support for the goal

model indicates that rewards may not be important as long as
difficult goals are assigned.

Support for the goal choice

model indicates that the magnitude of the reward is
irrelevant as long as high performance is rewarded more than
low performance.

Support for a goal force model indicates

that the size or magnitude of the reward is the determinant
of motivation.

Support for the unified model indicates that

both an individual's goal level and the perceived
consequences of goal achievement are significant predictors
of motivation, and that both must be considered when
designing motivation systems.
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Chapter 3

Research Methodology

Design

The goal of this study was to make causal inferences
about variance in effort within and between goal levels.
Therefore, a laboratory experiment was used to maximize both
the within-goal and between-goal variance in those variables
hypothesized to influence effort-probabilities, valences,
and goals.

The experimental design is a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial

design with two covariates.

The factors were:

1) assigned

goal level, 2) probabilities, and 3) valences with sex and
ability as covariates.

Although sex differences were not a

central issue in this research, sex was included as a
covariate because it is possible that men and women react to
goal assignment or goal difficulty differently.
A between subjects design was used because a between
subjects design makes it more difficult for subjects to
figure out the experimental manipulations.

Pany & Reckers

(1986) have demonstrated that within-subject designs can
lead to misleading conclusions because respondents are
easily able to perceive the manipulations within the task
and infer the focus of the research, introducing the
possibility of a strong demand effect.
Some reviewers have concluded that expectancy theory
requires a within-subject design (Connolly & Wolf, 1981;
Kopelman, 1977; Mitchell, 1982; Wolf & Connolly, 1981).
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They base their conclusion on the fact that Vroom's theory
requires a within-subject choice.

A within-subject choice,

however, is not the same thing as a within-subject design.
In a within-subject design the same subject is administered
various levels of the experimental treatment.

A subject can

be given a choice among many performance levels even if no
treatments are given.

As Kennedy et al. (1983) point out,

the question is whether a choice model is used, or a single
alternative model is used (see Chapter 2 for a discussion of
the differences in these models) not whether a within or
between subjects design is used.
The between subjects design has been criticized because
the failure to adequately account for individual differences
may lead one to conclude that a theory is not valid, when in
fact the theory is valid (Kennedy et al., 1983; Kopelman,
1977).

However, individual differences can be dealt with,

as they were in this study, by using randomization, or, by
measuring the variable and including it as a covariate.
Between-subjects design have also been criticized because
the lack of a ratio level valence measure (Arnold & Evans,
1979) makes between subjects comparisons impossible.
Sussman & Vecchio (1985), however, demonstrate that it is
possible to obtain a ratio level measure of valence
compatible with Vroom's (1964) theory.
subjects

The subjects were 253 undergraduate college students of
Western Michigan University enrolled in the Introduction to
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statistics course.

The students were given extra class

points· for participating in the experiment.

The subjects

were told the purpose of the experiment was to create a data
base which could be used by future statistics students.
45% were female.

58% were sophomores, 34% juniors, and the

remainder seniors or graduate students.
the ages of 18 and 21.
white.

77% were between

The majority of the sample (91%) was

23% worked 40 or more hours a week, 45% worked

between 20 and 40 hours per week, and 22% worked between

o and 20 hours per week.

The experiment was conducted

during the students' normally scheduled class time.

The

subjects were randomly assigned to conditions by class
section.
Task

The task was a ring toss similar to Atkinson and Litwin
(1960), Litwin (1966), and Hamilton (1974).

Based on

personal conversations with Hamilton the equipment was
constructed to be as similar to that used by Hamilton (1974)
as possible.

The equipment consisted of a peg 12 inches

high and 1 1/4 inches in diameter.

The peg was inserted

into a hole in a 2 ft. by 2 ft. by 3/4 in. plywood base.
The result was a stake similar to those used in horseshoes.
Ten inch diameter rings were constructed from 3/8 in.
flexible plastic tubing.

The task was to go from a line to

a box of rings, obtain one ring, return to the line, and
attempt to toss the ring over the stake (see Figure 7).

The
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subjects scored one point each time they tossed the ring
over the stake.
Each trial was two minutes long and the students could
throw as many rings during the two minutes as they chose to
throw (the box contained 21 rings and no one was able to
retrieve and throw 21 rings during a two minute trial) .
Experimental Manipulations.
The sequence of trials, manipulation, and measurement
is indicated in Figure 8.

The subjects participated in the

ring toss trials in groups of eighteen (eighteen stakes were
set up in an old gym adjacent to the college).

This meant

that while one-half the class was completing the ring toss
the other half of the class was filling out a questionnaire.
During the pretrial period, subjects were told they would
have two minutes to score as many points as possible.
Goal manipulation.

Goals levels were manipulated by

telling the subjects that while the task was new to them, it
was actually an ancient Chinese game (which my Chinese
graduate assistant assured me was true), and that the
Chinese try to score either six (moderate goal condition) or
nine (extremely difficult goal condition) points within the
two minute period.

They were then told that now that they

were familiar with the game they would be given another two
minute period to play the "real"

Chinese game, and that

their goal for the next period should be to score either six
or nine (depending on the goal condition) points.
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Figure 7
Experimental Task

I I
I I

Box

25 ft.

Line

Stake
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Figure 8
sequence of Trials and Questionnaire Measures

1.

Pretrial

2. Measure Effort & Performance
3. Assign goal and Inform of Reward if Applicable
4. Complete Questionnaire 1
5. Trial 1
6. Measure Effort & Performance; Complete Questionnaire 2
7. Trial 2
8. Measure Effort & Performance; Complete Questionnaire 3
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Probability manipulation.

Probabilities were

manipulated by changing the distance between the line and
the stake.

Subjects in the moderate probability condition

threw from a line which was 9 ft. from the stake (a priori
objective probability of scoring a ringer equals .4);
subjects in the low probability condition threw from a line
which was 11 ft. from the stake (a priori objective
probability of scoring a ringer equals .2).
moved, not the line.

The stake was

This was done so that the distance

between the line and the box would be 25 ft. in all
conditions.
Valence manipulation.

Valences were manipulated by

telling the subjects in the reward condition that they would
receive a reward if they scored at least the assigned number
of points.

The reward was a packet of coupons good for free

food at a variety of fast food establishments (Mc Donalds,
Burger King, Little Ceasar's Pizza, Pizza Hut).

The

approximate monetary value of the coupon packet was seven
dollars.
Questionnaire Measures
Several of the variables were measured through
questionnaires.

A copy of the complete questionnaire is

included in Appendix A.
Goals.

The assigned goal measure asked subjects if

their assigned goal was a) to score 4 points, b) to score
6 points, c) to score 9 points), d) to score 11 points, or
e) something else.
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The individual goal measure asked subjects if their personal
goal was a) to score 1 or less points, b) to score 2 or
3 points, c) to score 4 or 5 points, d) to score 6 or
7 points, e) to score 8 or 9 points, f) to score 10 or
11 points, g) to score more than 11 points, h) to do your
best, or i) something else.

The goals were paired to reduce

the number of responses subjects had to make.

The effort

goal measure asked subjects if they intended to a) run,
b) jog, c) walk normally, or d) walk slowly during the next
period.
Expectancies.

Subjects were asked the probability of

scoring a) 1 or more points, b) 2 or more points, c) 3 or
more points, d) 4 or more points, e) 5 or more points,
f) 6 or more points, g) 7 or more points, h) 8 or more
points, i) 9 or more points, j) 10 or more points, k) 11 or
more points.

These probabilities were summed to calculate

self-efficacy (Locke et al., 1986).
Valences.

While a variety of other anchors for valence

have been tried (such as behaviorally anchored rating
scales, and importance) there is little evidence that they
are superior to attractiveness or anticipated satisfaction
(Ilgen et al., 1981; Pecotich and Churchill, 1981).
Therefore, valences were measured

by asking students how

attractive they found the idea of 1) walking slowly,
2) walking normally, 3) jogging, and 4) running.

They were

also asked how attractive they found the idea of scoring
a) 1 or less points, b) 2 or 3 points, c) 4 or 5 points,
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d) 6 or 7 points, e) 8 or 9 points, f) 10 or 11 points, and
g) more than 11 points.

The third measure asked subjects

how satisfied they would be if they scored a) 1 or more
points, b) 2 or more points, c) 3 or more points, d) 4 or
more points, e) 5 or more points, f) 6 or more points,
g) 7 or more points, h) 8 or more points, i) 9 or more
points, j) 10 or more points, or k) 11 or more points.

The

valence of each of the performance levels was summed to
obtain Garland's (1985) summed valence measure.
In the extrinsic reward condition subjects were asked
how attractive they found the reward, and how much they
would pay for a packet of coupons.
Goal acceptance/goal commitment.

Questionnaire items

were developed for the goal acceptance and goal commitment
constructs so self-report measures could be used to test the
hypotheses in Chapter 2.

The questionnaire items included

the goal commitment items used by Hollenbeck, Williams, and
Klein (in press) as well as the goal acceptance and goal
commitment items used by Leifer and McGannon (1986).
Principle components factor analysis (see Table 1) indicated
that the questionnaire items loaded on three factors (the
criteria for retaining a factor was an igenvalue equal to or
greater than one, and items had to load .40 or greater on a
factor to be retained).

The three factors produced by the

analysis were labeled goal acceptance, positive

goa~

commitment, and negative goal commitment.
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The items loading on the goal acceptance and positive
commitment factors are the ones obtained from Leifer and
McGannon (1986).

However, the factor structure is not the

same as theirs.

The difference may be due to the fact that

their analysis had 12 items and only 32 subjects.

The

results presented here are from an analysis of forty items.
The analysis used all questionnaires completed during the
experiment (605 useable questionnaires).

The data set

contained three questionnaires from each subject (each
subject completed the same questionnaire three different
times; see Figure 8).

The analysis was also done separately

for each time period with only Leifer and McGannon's (1986)
items; and with just Leifer and McGannon (1986) and
Hollenbeck et al.'s (in press) items, but the results were
essentially the same.

The only difference across these

analysis is that if only Leifer and McGannon's items are
used there is no negative commitment factor (since all the
questionnaire items loading on the negative commitment
factor are Hollenbeck's).

This would indicate that the goal

acceptance factor and the positive goal commitment factor
are not influenced by the presence or absence of
Hollenbeck's items.
The factors labeled postive or negative commitment may
not be measuring commitment in the same way commitment was
conceptualized in Chapter 2.

Traditionally, goal commitment

has been used to refer to assigned goals.

In Chapter 2,

however, goal commitment was defined as the willingness to
exert effort toward an individual goal.
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Table 1
Factor Loadings for Goal Acceptance/Goal Commitment Items
Factor
Loadings

Goal Acceptance Items

1. How hard will you honestly try to achieve your
personal goal?
2. Acceptance of a goal means assuming the assigned
goal as your own personal goal. To what extent do
you accept the assigned goal for this game?
3. Of the maximum effort (100%) you could exert in
pursuit of your goal, what percentage do you think
you will exert?
4. To what extent will you strive to attain your goal?
5. To what extent to you honestly accept the
performance goal determined for you on this task?
Cronbach's alpha = .90

Test-retest

.80
.76
.76
.77
.73

.78

Positive Goal Commitment Items
1. How enthusiastic are you about attempting to
achieve your personal goal?
2. Commitment to a goal means the determination
and persistence to achieve a goal. To what
extent are you committed to your goal?
3. How determined are you to reach your performance
goal
Cronbach's alpha= .71

Test-retest

.70
.73
.67

.56

Negative Goal Commitment Items
1. There's not much to be gained by trying to
achieve this goal
2. It is quit possible that this goal needs to be
changed
3. Quite frankly, I don't care if I achieve this
goal or not.
4. It's unrealistic for me to expect to reach this
goal
5. It wouldn't take long for me to abandon this goal
6. Since it's hard to tell how hard a goal is until
you've played a game for awhile, it's hard for
me to take this goal seriously
Cronbach's alpha = .87

*

.56
.54
.49
.49
.68
.68

Test-retest= .74

test-retest correlation coefficients are between Trials 1
&2
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An attempt was made to obtain a separate measure of
commitment to the assigned goal and commitment to the
individual's goal by phrasing some of the questions so that
they ask about "your goal," or "your personal goal," while
other questions ask about assigned goals.

Instead of

obtaining two factors, however, only one factor which
contained both types of questions emerged.

This may mean

that individuals were responding to all the questions as
though they referred to either individual or assigned goals,
or it may mean that for most individuals assigned and
individual goals were the same.
Ability Measure.

Ability was measured as the number of

ringers scored during the pretrial.
Critera Measures.

During each trial, effort was

measured as the number of feet traveled by the subject
during the two minutes, and performance as the number of
ringers scored in two minutes.
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Chapter 4
Results

Chapter 4 presents the results of the analysis of the
data collected during the experiment.

First, the results of

tests of the experimental manipulations are presented.

The

experimental manipulations were analyzed to determine if the
manipulations had created significant variance in the
variables manipulated.

Next, the results of the tests of

the hypotheses related to each major linkage in the model
presented in Chapter 2 are discussed.
Manipulation Checks
Goal assignment.

The goal assignment manipulation was

checked by asking subjects what their assigned goal was.
Ten subjects were dropped because they reported assigned
goals other than the one actually assigned to their group.
Subjects were also asked, "How difficult do you think it
will be to achieve the performance goal you were assigned?"
(12 point response scale ranging from very easy [1] to very
difficult [12]).

The mean response in the moderate goal

condition was 7.02 (s.d. = 2.89) and in the hard goal
condition the mean response was 8.17 (s.d.

=

2.58).

The

perceived difficulty in the hard goal condition was
significantly higher than in the moderate goal condition
(p < .001) which indicates the manipulation was successful.
Probabilities.

Subjects in the low probability

condition (11 ft. from the stake) should have perceived
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lower probabilities of scoring points than subjects in the
moderate probability condition (9 ft. from the stake).

As

Table 2 shows, in Trial 1 the subjective probability of
achieving each goal level was higher in the moderate
probability condition than in the low probability condition,
indicating a successful manipulation.
Valences.

The valence/reward manipulation was checked

by asking subjects in the reward condition how attractive
they found the coupons.

The average response of 3.3 on a 7

point scale (from highly attractive [1] to highly
unattractive [7] suggests subjects found the prize somewhat
attractive.

The average amount subjects would pay for a

packet of coupons was $1.18.
There is some question about whether offering an
extrinsic reward increases or decreases intrinsic
satisfaction (Deci, 1976).

In this experiment the reward

was offered for achieving the assigned goal. If Deci is
correct the intrinsic satisfaction of achieving the assigned
goal (either 6 or 9 ringers) should be different between the
reward and no-reward group.

Table 3 and 4 compare the

attractiveness of the two assigned goal levels for the
reward and no-reward conditions.

As can be seen from Table

3, during Trial 1 subjects perceived the goal of scoring 6
or 7 ringers to be more attractive in the no-reward
condition.

In Trial 2, however, there was no significant

difference between the groups (Table 4).

The attractiveness

of scoring 8 or 9 ringers was not significantly different in
the reward/no-reward conditions during Trial 1 or Trial 2.
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Table 2
Probabilities-Low
Trial 1

Prob. of
scoring
at least:

vs. Moderate Probability Condition

Low Prob.
Condition

Moderate Prob.
condition

E
test

--------------------------------------------------------1 point
.82
.85
2.62*
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II

.74
.67
.58
.48
.40
.29
.21
.15
.09
.07

.83
.80
.76
.70
.64
.56
.49
.41
.30
.20

9.74***
19.36***
27.09***
44.42***
64.38***
84.37***
82.85***
69.90***
57.93***
22.42***

* p < .10
*** p < .01
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Table 3
Intrinsic satisfaction-Reward vs. No Reward
Trial 1

Attractiveness
of
scoring

No Reward
mean

Reward
mean

:t

test

6 or 7 ringers

1.01

.65

5.14**

8 or 9 ringers

1.51

1. 43

.68

** p < .05
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Table 4
Intrinsic satisfaction-Reward vs. No Reward
Trial 2
Attractiveness
of

scoring

No Reward
mean

6 or 7 ringers

.71

8 or 9 ringers

1.42

Reward
mean
.84
1. 54

.t

test
.52
1. 01
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The one significant difference in Trial 1 supports Deci's
theory, but the three non-significant differences do not
support his theory.
Test

of the Linkage Between Goal Assignment and

Expectancies/Valences

The unified model views goal assignment as an external
event that affects motivation by influencing expectancies
and/or valences and subsequently goal choice and
motivational force.

The first three hypotheses test this

view by examining the effects of goal assignment on valences
and expectancies.
HlA:

If a specific goal level (G) is assigned,

then the intrinsic satisfaction of achieving goal
level G will be higher than the intrinsic
satisfaction of achieving any goal level lower
than the assigned goal level. (Naylor & Ilgen,
1984) •

For Hypothesis lA to be supported subjects would have
to perceive the attractiveness of scoring the assigned
number of points to be higher than the attractiveness of any
lower goal level.

Table 5 contains the average response to

the goal attractiveness question for the moderate goal
condition, and Table 6 contains the same information for the
hard goal condition.

As can be seen from Tables 5 and 6,

Hypothesis lA is supported.

In both goal conditions

subjects perceive the assigned goal level to be more
attractive than lower goal levels.
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Table 5
Attractiveness of Assiqned Goal Level vs. other Goal Levels
Moderate Goal condition-Trial 1
n=113
Attractiveness
of scoring
< 2 points
2 or 3 II
4 or 5 II
*6 or 7 II
8 or 9 II
10 or 11 II
> 11

*

II

Moderate Goal
Mean
-.98
-. 62
.19
.94
1. 48
1. 70
1. 76

Assigned goal
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Table 6
Attractiveness of Assigned Goal Level vs. other Goal Levels
Hard Goal Condition-Trial 1
n=127

Attractiveness
of scoring
< 2 points
II
2 or 3
II
4 or 5
II
6 or 7
II
*8 or 9
10 or 11 II
II
> ll

*

Moderate Goal
Mean
-1.18
-.68
.05
.76
1.46
1.80
1.85

Assigned goal

The response scale ranged from extremely attractive [2] to
extremely unattractive [-2].
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However, subjects did not perceive the assigned goal
level more attractive than higher goal levels.

The problem

with this hypothesis is that support for this hypothesis
does not necessarily mean that goal assignment has affected
the valence of goals.
goals.

Subjects may simply prefer harder

A better test would be to compare the attractiveness

of the 6 or 7 goal in the moderate and hard goal conditions.
If goal assignment is having an effect, the moderate goal
subjects should perceive 6 or 7 to be more attractive than
the hard goal subjects.

The mean attractiveness of the 6 or

7 goal in the hard goal condition is significantly lower

Ct= 1.77, p = .04) than the mean score in the moderate goal
condition which supports the hypothesis that goal assignment
affects goal valence.
HlB:

The summed valence of reaching each of all

possible goal levels will be higher in the
moderate goal condition than in the hard goal
condition (Garland, 1985).
Garland's summed valence measure was calculated as:
Sum Valence =

~

CVi; where i ranges from 1 to 11 and CV

equals the cumulative valence of scoring 1 or more ringers,
2 or more ringers, etc.

The mean summed valence for the

moderate goal condition equals 8.6 (s.d.= 8.9).

The mean

summed valence for the hard goal condition equals 6.97
(s.d. = 9.23).

The summed valences are significantly

different (t = 1.39, p < .10) in the direction hypothesized
by Garland.
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H2:

Subjects in the hard goal condition will

assign a higher subjective probability to
achieving a given goal level than the subjective
probability assigned to the same goal level by
subjects in the moderate goal condition. (Garland,
1985) •

To test Hypothesis 2 one can subtract the average
subjective probability of achieving any given goal level in
the hard goal condition from the average subjective
probability of achieving the same goal level in the moderate
goal level.

If Hypothesis 2 is correct, the differences

should be negative.

Instead, as can be seen from Tables 7

and 8, the signs of the differences are positive (a sign
test indicates that the number of positive differences is
greater than would be expected from chance [P < .05]).
While there is a significant difference, it is in the
opposite direction predicted by Garland.
test Hypothesis 2 is to compare the

Another way to

mean summed probability

(or self-efficacy) score for the moderate and hard goal
conditions.

Garland's hypothesis would predict the self-

efficacy score to be higher in the hard goal condition.
Actually, the average self-efficacy score was 5.7
(s.d.
(s.d.

= 2.5)
= 2.5)

in the moderate goal condition, and 5.4
in the hard goal

condition~

While the

difference is not statistically significant, it is
interesting to note that the higher score is in the moderate
goal condition--opposite the direction predicted by Garland.
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Table 7
Simple Subjective Probabilities-Moderate vs. Hard Goal
Condition
Trial 2

------------------------------------------------------Sign of
Moderate Goal
Hard Goal

Probability
of scoring

Mean

(S.d.)

Mean (S.d.)

MG-HG

------------------------------------------------------points .76
(. 36)
.78
< 2
(.33)
or
or
or
or
or
> 11

2
4
6
8
10

3
5
7
9
11

II
II
II
II
II
II

.78
• 67
.53
.42
.30
.22

(.28)
(.29)
(. 31)
(.32)
(. 30)
(. 28)

.78
.65
.51
.39
.26
.20

(.22)
(.29)
(. 29)
(.29)
(.28)
(.27)

0

+
+
+
+
+

-------------------------------------------------------
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Table

a

cumulative Probabilities-Moderate vs. Hard Goals
Trial 2

Probability
of scoring

Moderate Goal
Mean
(S .d.)

1 or > points

.85
.81
.77
.69
.62
.55

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

.29

10
11

.19
.14

.43

.35

(. 29)
(. 2 9)
(. 2 9)

( • 3 0)
(. 30)
(. 30)
(. 31)
(. 3 0)
(. 29)
(. 25)
(. 2 3)

Hard Goal
Mean (S .d.)
.81
.76
.70
.64
.56
.49
.42
.35
.28

.20
.13

(. 3 3)

(. 34)
(. 34)
(. 3 3)
(.32)
(. 31)
(. 30)
(.30)
(. 28)
(. 25)
(. 22)

Sign of
MG-HG
+
+
+
+
+
+

+
+
+
+
+

-------------~-----------------------------------------
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Tests of the Linkage between Goal Choice and Individual
Goals
The third hypothesis tests the ability of the
expectancy choice portion of the model to predict individual
goals.
H3:

If faced with a choice among goal levels,

then the individual will choose the goal level
with the highest expected value.
To test this hypothesis the expected value of each goal
level was compared with the expected value of all other goal
levels for each individual.

The goal level with the highest

expected value was the individual's predicted goal level.
The predicted goal level was then compared to the stated
goal level by examining the correlation between the
predicted goal and the individual's stated goal (a withinsubject choice, but a between subjects design).

The

expected value of a goal level was measured as the
attractiveness of that goal level (see Chapter 2, valence
measures).
For Trial 1 the mean predicted effort level was 2.4
(s.d.

=

(s.d.
4=run).

1.1) while the mean stated effort level goal was 3.2
.62) (l=walk slowly, 2=walk normally, 3=jog, and
The correlation between the predicted and stated

goal level was .39 (p < .01).

For Trial 2 the mean

predicted effort level was 2.1 (s.d.

= 1.1) while the mean

stated effort level goal was 3.1 (s.d. = .73) and the
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correlation was .37 (p < .01).

The significant correlations

support Hypothesis 3.
In Trial 1 the mean predicted performance goal was
6.4 points (s.d. = 2.9) while the stated individual
performance goal level was 7.0 points (s.d.

=

2.4).

The

correlation between predicted and stated goal level is
.52 (p < .01).

In Trial 2 the mean predicted performance

goal was 6.1 points (s.d.

= 3.3)

while the stated individual

performance goal level was 7.0 (s.d.

=

2.8) points.

The

correlation between predicted and stated goal level is
.45 (p < .01).
Hypothesis 3.

Again, the significant correlations support
Although the model does not predict the

absolute goal value very well, it does predict the rank
ordering of goal level among people.
Tests of the Linkage between Expected Value, Goal
Acceptance, & Goal Commitment

H4:

If the difference between an individual's

goal and assigned goal decreases, then goal
acceptance will increase.
HS:

If the utility of a goal increases, then

commitment
H6:

toward the goal will increase.

If commitment to a goal increases, then

effort toward the goal will increase.
Tables 9 and 10 contain the correlations between the
difference in individual goals (IG) and assigned goals (AG),
the various questionnaire measures of goal acceptance/
commitment, motivational force score, and effort.

The
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motivational force score (MFS) was the individual's
anticipated satisfaction with achieving his or her
individual point goal.

Hypothesis 4 indicates that the IG

minus AG measure should be negatively correlated with the
goal acceptance measure.

As Table 9 shows in Trial 1 the

correlation was -.28 (p < .01) and in Trial 2 (Table 10) the
correlation was -.40 (p < .01).

The significant

correlations support Hypothesis 4.
For Hypothesis 5 to be supported MFS should be
positively correlated with positive goal commitment and
negatively correlated with negative goal commitment.

In

fact MFS was significantly correlated with negative goal
commitment in Trial 1 (r

= -.16,

p < .05), however, it was

not significantly correlated with the questionnaire measure
labeled positive goal commitment.
correlated with goal acceptance.

MFS was significantly
The reason MFS was

significantly correlated with goal acceptance and not
significantly correlated with positive goal commitment may
that, as was noted in Chapter 3, the empirical measures of
goal acceptance and goal commitment do not capture the
difference in the constructs conceptualized in Chapter 2.
In Trial 2 MFS was significantly correlated with both
goal acceptance and positive goal commitment, and
significantly negatively correlated with negative goal
commitment (see Table 10).

Overall the results support

Hypothesis 5.
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Hypothesis 6 tests the linkage between goal commitment
and effort.

In Trial 1 effort was not significantly

correlated with either the positive or negative goal
commitment measures (see Table 9).

In Trial 2 effort was

negatively correlated with the negative goal commitment
measure, but was not significantly correlated with the
positive goal commitment measure (see Table 10) •

Not only

should effort be correlated with the goal acceptance/goal
commitment measures, but, because motivational force is
hypothesized to be the determinant of goal commitment,
effort should have also been positively correlated with MFS.
As can be seen from Tables 9 and 10 MFS was significantly
correlated with effort (p < .05).

The results indicate

mixed support for Hypothesis 6.
Tests of the Linkage between Goals and Effort
H7:

If an individual's goal level increases, then

effort will increase.
Tables 11 and 12 contains the correlations among
predicted goals, stated goals, assigned goals and effort for
the two trials.

According to the arguments presented in

Chapter 2, the strongest correlation should be between the
individual's stated goal and effort.

The correlation

between predicted goals and effort should be somewhat lower
because of the additional error introduced by predicting
(rather than directly measuring) the individual's goal.

The

correlation between assigned goals and effort should be the
lowest of the three because goal assignment is hypothesized
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to affect effort only through its effect on individual
goals.

As can be seen from Tables 11 and 12, the only

correlation not significant (p < .05) is between effort and
assigned goals during Trial 1.

Overall the results support

Hypothesis 7.
Tests of the Unified Model vs. Other Models.
Hypotheses 8-13 were tested using hierarchical multiple
regression analysis.

Tables 13, 14, 15, and 16 present the

result of these analysis.

The column headed change in R2 is

the increase in R2 resulting from the addition of that
variable to the model.

Significance levels for the increase

in R2 were calculated according to Kerlinger, (1986).

In

each analysis ability (the subject's pre-test performance
score) and sex were used as covariates.
HS:

Adding goal commitment to a model that

contains an individual's goal (predicted on a
within-subject basis using the expectancy choice
model), will significantly improve the predictive
ability of the model.
Hypothesis 8 tests the unified model against the
traditional goal choice model.

Support for this hypothesis

indicates support for the unified theory.

Because of the

high correlation among the three questionnaire measures of
goal acceptance and goal commitment, only the first factor
produced by the factor analysis (previously labeled goal
acceptance) was used to test hypotheses involving goal
acceptance or goal commitment.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

92

The addition of goal acceptance did not improve the
effort model in Trial 1 (see Table 13), but did
significantly improve prediction in Trial 2 (see Table 14).
The same results were obtained when performance was used as
the dependent variable; addition of goal acceptance did not
yield significant improvements in Trial 1 (see Table 15),
but did yield significant improvements in Trial 2 (see
Table 16).

It may be that most subjects were highly

committed to the assigned goal during the first trial, and
that there was no significant variance in the degree of goal
acceptance

until the second trial when subjects were

beginning to become tired of the exercise.
trial this was a novel, new game.

During the first

By the second trial

students were beginning to become physically tired, it was
close to the end of the class, and they were ready to quit.
As a result the intrinsic satisfaction, and therefore goal
acceptance/goal commitment, should have been higher during
the first trial than during the second trial.
H9:

Adding assigned goals to a model that

contains goal commitment and an individual's goal
will not improve the predictive ability of the
model.
Hypothesis 9 tests the unified model against the traditional
goal setting model.

Support of Hypothesis 9 supports the

unified theory, rejection of Hypothesis 9 supports the
traditional goal setting model.
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Table 9
Correlations between Acceptance, Commitment, MFS, & Effort
Trial 1, n
250

=

1

1. IG

- AG

4. Neg. Com.

3

5

6

-.08

1.00
.34**

1.00

.31**

-.63**

5. MFS

-.32**

.28**

.02

6. Effort

-.32**

.17**

-.01

*

4

1.00

2. Goal Accept. -.28**
3. Pos. Com.

2

-.31**

1. 00
-.16*
-.01

1.00
.14*

1. 00

p < .05

= p < .01
I.G. = individual's goal
A.G.
assigned goal
Pos. Com. = postive goal commitment
Neg. Com. = negative goal commitment
**

MFS

= motivational

force score
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Table 10
correlations between Acceptance, commitment, MFS, & Effort
Trial 2, n
225

=

1

2

3

4

5

6

-----------------------------------------------------------1. IG - AG
1.00
2. Goal Accept.

-.40** 1.00

3. Pas. Corn.

-.25**

4. Neg. Corn.

.44** 1. 00

.36** -.62** -.29** 1.00

5. MFS

-.34**

.39**

6. Effort

-.26**

.28** -.14

*
**

.20** -.26** 1. 00
-.29**

.21** 1. 00

< .05
< .01

I.G. = individual's goal
A.G. = assigned goal
Pas. Corn. = postive goal commitment
Neg. Corn. = negative goal commitment
MFS = motivational force score
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Table 11
correlation between Goals & Effort
Trial 1, n
250

=

1

2

3

4

----------------------------------------------1. Predicted Goal 1. 00
2. Stated Goal

.52**

3. Assigned Goal

.08

.22**

1.00

4. Effort

.23**

.40**

.08

1.00

1.00

** p < .01

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

96

Table 12
Correlation between Goals & Effort
Trial 2, n
250

=

1

2

3

4

---------------------------------------------1. Predicted Goal 1. 00
2. Stated Goal

.45**

3. Assigned Goal

.12

.20**

4. Effort

.19**

.35**

*
**

1. 00
1.00
.15*

1. 00

p < .05
p < .01
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Hypothesis 9 was supported in every instance except one;
adding assigned goals to the effort model in Trial 1
resulted in a significant increase in the predictive power
of the model.
HlO:

Adding the motivational force of high

performance to a model that contains an
individual's goal and goal commitment will not
significantly improve the model's predictive
ability.
Hypothesis 10 tests the unified theory against the
traditional expectancy force model.

Support of this

hypothesis supports the unified theory, rejection of this
hypothesis supports the traditional force model.

Hypothesis

10 was supported in both trials for both the effort and
performance models.
Hll:

Adding the slope of the utility curve to a

model that contains an individual's goal and goal
commitment will not significantly increase the
model's predictive ability.
Hypothesis 11 tests the unified theory against the
alternative formulations which use slope (return on effort)
(Kennedy et al., 1983; Kopelman, et al., 1978).

The results

support the unified model because the addition of slope was
not significant in Trials 1 or 2 for either the effort or
the performance model.
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H12:

Adding self-efficacy to a model which

contains an individual's goal and goal commitment
will not increase the model's predictive ability.
H13:

Adding summed valence to a model that

contains an individual's goal and goal commitment
will not increase the model's predictive ability.
Hypothesis 12 tests the unified model against models
which use self-efficacy and Hypothesis 13 against models
which use summed valence measures (i.e. Locke et al., 1986;
Garland, 1985).

The tests of Hypothesis 12 support the

unified theory because the addition of neither self-efficacy
nor summed valence resulted in a significant increase in R2
for the effort or performance models during Trials 1 or 2.
Overall, the hierarchical regression analysis supports
the unified model with two exceptions.

First, during Trial

1 goal commitment did not significantly increase the
explanatory power of the model, and assigned goals did
increase the explanatory power of the model.

This indicates

that the assigned goal was having an effect on effort other
than through its effect on individual goals or goal
commitment, a result inconsistent with the unified model.
In Trial 2, however, goal commitment did significantly
improve the model and assigned goal did not significantly
improve the model.

It may be that motivational differences

did not become apparent until the subjects were becoming
tired.
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Table 13
Tests of the Unified Model Against other Models;
Effort Regression Models-Trial 1 (n
178)

=

Change in R2
H8: overall model

.38
.27
.36
.38
.38

.27
.09
.02

.oo

32.8***
59.61***
24.47***
4.11**

.40

.02

5.62**

HlO: motivatinal force

.38

.oo

.oo

Hll: slope

.38

.00

.oo

Hl2: summed valence

.38

.oo

.oo

Hl3: self-efficacy

.38

.oo

.oo

.45

.07

22.74***

sex
ability
individual goal
goal acceptance
H9:

assigned goal

reward

.oo

** p < .05
*** p < .01
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Table 14
Tests of the unified Model Against other Models;
Effort Regression Models-Trial 2 (n
143)

=

Change in R2

HS: overall model
sex
goal acceptance
individual goal
ability

.23
.15
.21
.23
.23

.15
.06
.02
.00

H9:

assigned goal

.23

.oo

.oo

HlO: motivational force

.23

.oo

.oo

Hll: slope

.23

.oo

.oo

Hl2: summed valence

.24

.01

1. 35

Hl3: self-efficacy

.23

.00

.oo

.30

.07

12.60***

reward

8.40***
24.28***
11.55***
3.75**

.oo

** p < .05
*** p < .01
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Table 15
Tests of the Unified Model Aqainst other Models;
Performance Reqression Models-Trial 1 (n
166)

=

---------------------------------------------------Rz
Change in Rz
.E
---------------------------------------------------.47
H8: overall mode 1
24.19***
ability
sex
effort
individual goal
goal commitment

.40
.46
.47
.47
.47

.40
.06
.01

assigned goal

.48

.01

.78

HlO: motivational force

.48

.01

.78

Hll: slope

.47

.oo

.00

H12: summed valence

.48

.01

.78

H13: self-efficacy

.48

.01

.78

.48

.01

.78

H9:

reward

**
***

.oo
.oo

107.60***
18.94***
5.23**

.oo

.00

p < .05
p < .01
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Table 16
Tests of the Unified Model Aqainst other Models:
Performance Reqression Models-Trial 2 (n = 143)

---------------------------------------------------Rz
Change in Rz
E
---------------------------------------------------.50
HS: overall model
24.19***
individual goal
ability
goal acceptance
sex
effort

.34
.43
.46
.49
.50

.34
.09
.03
.03
.01

74.18***
20.47***
9.33***
9.33***
2.12

assigned goal

.50

.00

.oo

HlO: motivational force

.50

.oo

.oo

Hll: slope

.51

.01

2.72

H12: summed valence

.51

.01

2.72

Hl3: self-efficacy

.50

.oo

.oo

.51

.01

2.72

H9:

reward
** p < .05
p < .01

***
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In the performance models the addition of the
individual's stated goal and goal commitment should not have
been significant because the effect of goals and goal
commitment should be on effort and effort was already in the
model.
Trial 2.

This was true for Trial 1, but was not true for
In Trial 2 goal commitment and individual goals

were both significant predictors of performance.
One could speculate that during the experiment subjects
concluded that the primary determinant of performance was
not the number of ringers tossed (the measure of effort used
in this study), but concentration.

If so, goal commitment

and goal level may have been affecting other types of
effort, such as mental concentration, not measured in this
study.
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Chapter

s

Conclusions

Goal Assignment and Expectancies/Valences Linkage

This study was conducted, in part, because of the
belief that the empirical success of goal setting
researchers had led them dangerously close to assuming a
direct relationship between assigned goals and performance.
The danger in this line of reasoning is that it
oversimplifies the task of performance motivation.

If one

believes individuals generally accept any type and level of
performance goal, there is no need to be concerned with
whether the assigned goal level is reasonable or not.

In

fact, one could conclude that the best policy would be to
assign as difficult a goal as possible, even if it is
unattainable (which is the conclusion reached by Garland,
1983).

Furthermore, there is no reason to be concerned with

whether individuals find accomplishment of the assigned
goals intrinsically or extrinsically satisfying.

There is

no reason to study reward systems or the motivational
aspects of leadership.
In contrast to the view that assigned goals are the
primary explanation of differences in performance, the
theory proposed in this study argues that motivational
differences in

performance are due to either 1) difference

in individual goals, or

2) differences in the amount of

effort individuals are willing to exert toward a goal.
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It further proposes that the reason individuals have the
performance goal is because they have chosen to attempt a
particular goal level, and that the reason they have chosen
to attempt that performance level, and not others, is
because the consequences of attempting to perform at that
performance goal level are more favorable than the
consequences of performing at any other performance level.
The theory also recognizes that individuals with the same
goal may differ in the intensity or persistence of effort
exerted to accomplish the goal because of differences in the
magnitude of the expected value of goal accomplishment.
If this theory is correct, assigning difficult goals
may or may not increase performance.

If the assigned goal

level has a lower expected value than some other goal level
then the individual should not accept the assigned goal.
Even if the individual accepts the assigned goal, if the
expected value of accomplishing the goal is low, motivation
toward the goal should be low, the individual should not be
very committed

to the goal, and the individual should be

unwilling to engage in difficult or prolonged effort to
reach the goal.

Assigned goals would be only one of many

possible variables which could affect the value of reaching
a given goal level, and the only time assigning goals should
affect performance is when the act of assigning goals
affects the expected value of performing at various levels.
Because both the expectancy choice model and the
expectancy force model rely on probabilities and valences to
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determine expected value, the only way goal assignment could
affect goal choice, or motivation toward a goal, would be to
affect probability estimates or valences.

The significant

support for Hypothesis lA and Hypothesis lB provides
evidence for the proposed linkage between goal assignment
and expectancies/valences.

Individuals perceived goals

lower than the assigned goal to be less attractive than the
assigned or higher goal levels.
Although the analysis of the effect of goal assignment
on valences leads one to conclude that assigning difficult
goals has a positive effect by making high goal levels more
attractive than lower goal levels, the affect of goal
assignment on probabilities provides evidence that assigning
difficult goals may also have negative effects.

Subjects in

the moderate goal condition systematically perceived their
probability of achieving each of the various goal levels to
be higher than did subjects in the hard goal level, the
opposite of the hypothesized effect.

The original

hypothesis was based on Garland's (1985) reasoning that
subjects assigned difficult goals would interpret the
assignment as an indication that they were capable of
achieving difficult goals and, therefore, would have higher
probability estimates.

What actually seems to be happening

is that subjects are forming probability estimates based on
the expected probability of achieving the assigned goal.

If

they do not believe it very likely they will be able to
achieve the assigned goal, as happened in the hard goal

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

107

condition, they lose confidence not only in their ability to
reach the.assigned goal but other goals as well; an overall
decrease in self-confidence or self-efficacy.
This does not necessarily mean that the decrease in
self-confidence will result in lower effort or performance.
If higher goal levels have higher valences than lower goal
levels, the expected value of difficult goals may still be
greater than the expected value of lower goal levels.

If

so, even though the probability of success is lower, the
individual would still choose the higher goal and would
exert more effort.

In this study, for example, even though

subjects in the hard goal condition had lower probabilities,
they still had a mean individual goal of 7.5 points
(s.d.

=

2.9) compared to the moderate goal group's mean

individual goal of 6.58 points (s.d. = 2.5).
It does mean, however, that subjects in the hard goal
condition would have lower motivational force scores and
would be less committed to achieving the goal.

If the

inability to achieve an assigned goal does result in an
overall decrease in self-efficacy, self-confidence, or selfesteem further longitudinal studies are needed before
implementing Garland's (1985) recommendation that impossible
goals be assigned.
The evidence this study provides that goal assignment
has it effect, and is moderated by, probabilities and
valences, is important because it supports the belief that
goal acceptance and goal commitment should not be taken for
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granted, but should be studied as important motivational
constructs.

While it provides some evidence as to how goal

assignment affects motivation, many important questions
remain to be answered by future research.

When do assigned

goals improve performance and when do they not?

Is it

possible that some assigned goals actually hurt performance?
If so, under what conditions?

How and why does goal

assignment affect the probabilities and valences?

Are some

people who assign goals better at getting goal acceptance
and goal commitment than others?

If so, what do they do

different?
Linkage between Expected Value and Goal Choice
The next step in the causal chain proposed by the
unified model is that expectancies and valences should
affect effort through their effect on goal choice and
motivational force.

Even though the correlation is only .52

or .45 between predicted goals and stated goals, it should
be noted that the correlation between the individuals stated
goal and effort was only .40.

It does raise questions about

why an individual would indicate that they find goal A more
attractive than goal B, but then choose goal B.

One

possibility is that when subjects are asked the
attractiveness of a performance goal, the reported
attractiveness does not reflect the positive or negative
value of the effort level required to achieve the goal.

If

so, a model such as Evan's might produce higher
correlations.

Nevertheless, it does support the belief that
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individuals choose the performance level they will attempt,
and that, if one knows something about the perceived
consequences or expected value the individual associates
with various goal levels it is possible to predict the goal
they will choose.

If one wants individuals to choose high

performance goals, then the expected payoff for high
performance has to be higher than the expected payoff for
lo~

performance.

In terms of management practice, managers

should try to persuade those they manage that performing at
a high level is more intrinsically satisfying than
performing at lower levels.

Formal evaluation and reward

systems should be designed in ways that reward high
performance more than low performance.
While it is clear that high performance should be more
rewarding than low performance it is not clear exactly how
this condition should be created.

One strategy would be to

assign very difficult goals, tell people it is acceptable to
try and fail, reward goal accomplishment, and ignore goal
failure.

On the other hand, another way to create a

difference between high and low goals would be to assign a
difficult goal, then punish people for performing at levels
lower than the assigned levels.

All three types of

strategies are observed in practice, but expectancy theory
makes no predictions as to which of the three strategies is
better than the others, and, there have been no attempt to
determine empirically which strategy is most effective.
Consequently, further research is needed in this area.
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Linkage between Expected Value, Goal Acceptance and Goal
Commitment
Tests of the correlation between the expected value of
the individual's goal, various goal commitment/acceptance
measures, and effort were generally significant.

Because of

the problems with the goal commitment/goal acceptance
measures, if a distinction is to be made between goal
acceptance and goal commitment, goal commitment (like
expected value) is going to have to be measured with respect
to a specific referent.

Instead of asking individuals how

committed they are, the better approach would be to ask how
committed they are to a specific goal level.
Perhaps the most important contribution of this study
was the theoretical and empirical distinction between effort
variance attributable to goal variance, and the effort
variance within a goal group attributable to variation in
the motivational force toward the goal.

While motivation

theorist have recognized the importance of creating payoff
differentials between high and low performance for some
time, and subsequently have developed pay systems such as
bonus pay systems or piece-rate systems, the implications of
a "magnitude effect" does not seem to have received
sufficient attention.

rt may be that when differential pay

systems don't work, one of the major reasons is that even
though there is a pay differential. between high and low
performance, the magnitude of the expected payoff is so low,
that the motivational force is too weak to have a
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significant impact on effort and performance.

It is not

uncommon to hear of piece-rate systems, particularly, that
do not work.

In some cases workers find it more attractive

to work at the minimum wage rate than to attempt the higher
performance levels required to benefit from the piece rate.
It may be that the piece rate is so low, the workers are not
motivated by it.
The relationship between goal acceptance/goal
commitment and effort was stronger in the second trial than
in the first trial.

By the time the students participated

in the second trial they were physically tired, it was the
end of the class period, and they were ready to quit.

As a

result, differences in goal commitment were more pronounced
during the second trial.

This illustrates the importance of

recognizing that motivation is a multidimensional construct
involving not only direction and intensity, but persistence
as well.

In this case, by the time of the second trial many

of the students were no longer

willing to exert effort.

If

only one trial had been conducted, the persistance effect
would not have been detected.

It also indicates a possible

problem with relying exclusively on goal assignment to
motivate people.

While assigning goals may be one way of

initiating action, other types of motivation techniques,
such as extrinsic rewards, may be necessary to sustain
action.
While extrinsic rewards are important determinate of
goal commitment and goal acceptance, investigating the way
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in which intrinsic motivation can be used to increase goal
acceptance/goal commitment seems to be an important area for
future research.

If the act of assigning goals is enough to

change peoples intrinsic satisfaction with reaching certain
goals, it may be that other managerial actions, such as
persuading people of the value of accomplishing a certain
goal level, are also able to produce substantial changes in
intrinsic satisfaction.

In fact, it may be that the ability

to change individuals intrinsic satisfaction with performing
at various levels is one of the primary attributes of what

is sometimes called "charismatic leadership."
Linkage between Goals and Effort

As is the case in most goal setting studies, a
significant correlation was obtained between assigned goals
and effort.

It is interesting to note that in this study

the strongest correlation was between the individual's
stated goal and effort, and the correlation between the
predicted goal and effort was stronger than the correlation
between the assigned goal and effort.

One other point is

that while low correlations between predicted goals and
effort are sometimes cited as an indication of problems with
expectancy type models, the correlations between stated
goals (both stated effort goals and stated performance
goals) and effort were not very high either.

The fact that

the correlations were low, however, does not necessarily
indicate a problem with the theory.

It may be that

individuals with higher goals were trying harder along some
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dimension not measured as effort in this study.

In this

study effort was measured as the distance traveled during
the trial, but some individuals may not have tried hard by
running faster, but by running slower and concentrating
longer on each toss.
The Unified Model vs. Other Models

In general the results supported the unified model.
The unified theory was consistently highly significant in
the predicted direction.

Also, the marginal

E test

indicated that the addition of the unified model constructs
was significant even when variables from other models (such
as assigned goals) were already in the model.

However,

constructs from other models were not significant when they
were added to the unified model.

One exception was the

addition of assigned goals in Trial 1.

In Trial 1 the

marginal test of goal commitment was not significant, but
the marginal test of assigned goals was significant.
Trial 2 the exact opposite occurred.

In

The most reasonable

explanation seems to be that, as was discussed earlier,
motivational force (or commitment) did not become important
until subjects began to tire somewhat.
Another interesting conclusion is that sex was the most
significant variable.

On average females traveled 716 ft.

during the two minute period (s.d.
traveled 871 ft. (s.d.

=

104 ft.).

=

82 ft.) while men

Even when ability

differences were accounted for (by using pretest performance
as a covariate) men exerted more effort than women.

A
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review of the probabilities, valences, and goal commitment
measurements did not indicate any significant difference
between men and women.

It may be that there were ability

differences which the ability measure used here did not
adequately capture, or there may differences in the way men
and women react to goal assignment.

The data do not allow a

clear answer, but it would seem to be a promising area for
future research.

It may be that the act of assigning

difficult goals affects women differently than men.

At the

moment there is no theory which would explain how or why
that would be true.
Finally, in spite of the fact that both effort and
ability were already in the model, in Trial 2 the addition
of various measures such as goal commitment and goal valence
were still significant.

The most logical explanation would

seem to be that motivation was affecting concentration, not
just effort.
Contributions and Limitations
The major premise of this study was that the goalsetting, goal-choice, and goal-force models were not
contradictory, but complementary.

In general, this

conclusion seems to be supported.

The results indicate that

not only does high performance have to be more attractive
than low performance, the magnitude of the expected value of
high performance has an independent effect on motivation and
performance.
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Also, the study makes a methodological contribution by
clarifying the relationship between goal acceptance and goal
commitment, and by providing a technique for using a between
subjects design for testing expectancy theory models.
At the same time several caveats are in order.

The

first is that the subjects in the sample were college
students.

Even though most of the students worked at least

part time, it is not clear that student behavior on two
minute trials will generalize to other populations.

The

generalizability of laboratory studies that use students has
been questior.ed in some areas of research, and it has been
suggested that researchers should be required to demonstrate
that in his or her area of research the results obtained in
the laboratory using students are generalizable (Gordon,
Slade, & Schmitt, 1986).

Latham & Lee (1985), after

comparing field and laboratory studies of goal setting (most
of which used students and game-like tasks), concluded that
in goal setting research laboratory studies that use
students are generalizable, validating the use of lab
studies and students in this area of research.

Despite a

call for laboratory tests of expectancy theory (i.e. Daehler

& Mobley, 1973), most expectancy theory studies have been
field studies, and it is not clear if lab studies will
generalize or not.
Another reason the generalizability of the study might
be questioned is the use of a "game" instead of a "work"
type task.

The use of games to test organizational behavior
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theories has a long and varied tradition (Weick, 1965).
While games may appear to be artificial and lack the realism
of a

work task, what may be more important than realism is

what Zelditch & Evan (1962) have called the "rule of
genotypic similarity."

This rule states that "the

properties of a simulate need not look like the properties
they represent; what is required is that they obey the same
laws" (Weick, 1965).

In a similar vein, Zigler (1963)

concludes that tests of a theory seldom require a naturalappearing situation.

He reasons that if the principles

contained in a theory are relevant to one world (such as the
workplace) they should be relevant to other worlds (such as
laboratories) as well.

The critical question is not the

correspondence between the appearance of the lab task and
the appearance of real world task, but the correspondence
between the task and the theory (Weick, 1965) .

Differences

between real world subjects and laboratory subjects, or
between real world tasks and laboratory tasks are not
important unless one has some reason to believe that some
specific attribute of the subject or some attribute of the
task systematically correlate with the effect being studied
(Zelditch & Evan, 1962; Weick, 1967).

Finally, while it is

probably true that the use of students and games limits the
external validity or generalizability of a study, almost any
task, whether a game or not, can be criticized on the same
basis.

A simple clerical task may bear little resemblance

to most managerial or professional tasks.
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While the results were encouraging, important problems
remain.

It is still not clear how difficult a goal

individuals should be assigned or encouraged to set. ·Also,
better between subjects valence measures are needed.

Even

though there were significant differences in effort between
the reward and no-reward conditions, there were no
statistically significant differences in reported
attractiveness of goals.

One conclusion is that the

subjects were using different anchors when responding to the
question.

Also, the A, not A measures did not work.

Subjects did not know what "not A" was.

Does "not A" refer

to goals higher than the assigned goal, or lower than the
assigned goal, or both?

A possible solution is to change

the question so it asks about the valence of performing at
goal level "i" or higher, and the valence of performing at
goal level "i" or lower.
Finally, it is not clear what the precise formulation
is for predicting goal valence.

Many different equations

have been proposed under the label "expectancy theory," and
it is not clear which formulation, if any, actually captures
the valences used by subjects when making performance
decisions.
In terms of the implications for managers, it seems
clear that both goal level and goal commitment are
important.

If it is possible to get significant variance in

effort toward a goal using a game, college students, and two
minute trials, the variance among employees is probably much
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higher.

The basic recommendation would be to make high

performance more attractive than low performance, and to
make the magnitude of the attractiveness large enough to
gain goal commitment.
Even so, several important questions remain.

One is,

"When it comes to rewards, how large is large enough?"
Another is, "How difficult is difficult enough, and how
difficult is too difficult?" In this study, as in most
studies, the subjects performed better when difficult goals
were assigned, even though the objective probability of
achieving the assigned goal was very low.

Nevertheless, it

seems unwise to recommend that managers assign unachievable
goals at this time.

In lab studies the consequences of not

achieving a goal are not very substantial.

In real work

situations the consequences for not achieving a goal are
often very substantial.

It may well be that this results in

a very different reaction to the assignment of difficult
goals.
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RING-TOSS QUESTIONNAIRE

s. s .1; ________

PLEASE ANSWER EACH OF THE QUESTIONS BELOW BY MARKING THE NUMBER OR LETTER /
Of THE DESCRIPTION WHICH BEST FITS YOU OR BY WRITING IN THE CORRECT ANSWER./
2. What is your personal goal
for the next period?
a. To score 1 or 2 points
b. To score 2 or 3 points
c. To score 4 or 5 points
d. To score 6 or 7 points
e. To score 8 or 9 points
f. To score 10 or 11 points
g. To score more than 11 points
h. To do your best
i. Something else

l. What goal were you assigned for

the next period?
a.
b.
c.
. d.
e.

To score 4 points
To score 6 points
To score 9 points
To score 11 points
Something else

2. How would you describe this game?
Unpleasant
Dull
Significant
Challenging
Boring
Satisfying
Tedious
3.

0-----1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
0-----1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
0-----1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
0-----1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
0-----1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
0-----1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
0-----1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7

Pleasant
Exciting
Pointless
Trivial
Interesting
Unsatisfying
Fun

How hard will you honestly try to achieve your personal goal?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6----7-----8-----9-----10-----11-----12
not at
average
very
all hard
hard
4.

How enthusiastic are you about attempting to achieve your personal goal?
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----~-----10-----ll-----12

very
enthusiastic
5.

average

very
unenthusiastic

Acceptance of a goal means assuming the assigned goal as your own personal
goal. To what extent to you accept the assigned goal for this game?
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10-----11-----12
do not
neutral
fully accept
accept
the goal
1
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6.

Commitment to a goal means the determination and persistence to achieve a
goal. To what extent are you committed to the your goal?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10-----11-----12
neutral
not at all
very
committed
committed
7.

In your opinion, how reasonable was the goal you were asked to work
for?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10-----11-----12
very
neutral
very
unreasonable
reasonabl"
8.

How determined are you to reach your performance goal?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10-----11-----12
neutral
not at all d:-termi:1c-d
very
determined
9.

Of the maximum effort (100%) you could exert in pursuit of your goal,
what percentage do you think you will exert?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10-----11-----12
0%
50%
100%
10. How difficult to you think it will be to achieve the performance goal
you were assigned?
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10-----11-----12
very
moderately
verv
easy
diffi~ul t
difficult
11. To what extent will you strive to attain the your goal?
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----5-----7-----8-----9-----10-----11-----12
will not
somewhat
will
strive
strive
strive
12. To what extent do you honestly accept the performance goal determined
for you on this task?
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10-----11-----12
do not
somewhat
completely
accept
accept
accept
13. How satisfied were you with your performance during the last period?
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10-----11-----12
very satisfied
neutral
very dissatisfieJ

2
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15. How difficult is this game?

14. How interesting is this game?

[ l] very difficult
(2] somewhat difficult
(3] average
(4] somewhat easy
[ sI very easy

[ l I very interesting
(2 I somewhat interesting
[ 3 I average
(4] somewhat uninteresting
[ 5 J very uninteresting

17. How enjoyable do you find

16. How challenging do you find

this game?

this game?

[ l] very enjoyable
[2 J somewhat enjoyable
[ 3 J average
[4] somewhat unenjoyable
Is I very unenjoyable

[ lJ very challenging
(2 J somewhat challenging
(3 I average
(4] somewhat unchallenging
[ 5 J very unchallenging

3

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

135

I INDICATE THE EXTENT TO tJHICH YOU AGREE OR I
I
I DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS

"

,:;

~

..."
"
00

;.;

C\l

>.

~

c

...""00

"...."

......
0

~

00

<:

"'

0

->-.
~
"'

l. I am strongly committed co pursuing my goal in this game ..... [l] [2] [3) . .
4. There's not much co be gained by trying to achieve chis goal.[l] [2! :3; . .
2. I am willing co put forth a great deal of effort beyond
what I would normally do to achieve this goal ............. ... [lJ [2] [3J

·~·

5. It is quite possible chat this goal needs to be changed ...... [l] [2] [3]

..

3. Quite frankly, I don't care if I achieve this goal or noc .... [l] [2] [3! '.4'.
7. It's unrealistic for me co expect to reach this goal. ........ [l] [2] '.3]

..

6. It wouldn't take long for me Co abandon this goal ............ [l] [2] :3J

.. .

8. Since it's hard co tell how hard a goal is until you've
played a game for awhile, it's hard for me co cake
chis goal seriously .......................................... [ l

J

[

2) [ 3] [ 4:

9. I think chis goal is a good goal to shoot for ................ [l] [2] [3] [4;
10. Performance on this game is primarily due co luck ........... [lJ (2) [3]

~4!

11. Performance on this game is primarily due co effort ......... [ll (2] [3! [4]
12. Performance on this game is primarily due co the diffi·
31

... ;

13. Performance on this game is primarily due Co ability ........ [l] [ 2 J [ 3 !

[~;

culcy of the game ............................... ·............ [ l] [ 2 J

14. Accomplishing this goal will give me a sense of achievement. [l]

~

(2 J [ 3] (4]

4
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Subjective probabilities are numbers which indicate how likely
it is that an event will occur. A probability can be any number
between 0 and 1. If the probability is 0, there is no possibility
that the event will occur. If the probability is l, the event is
certain to occur. For example, if you flip a coin, the probability
of getting a head is 0.5
16. If you walk at a normal pace,
what is the probability that
you will score:

15. If you walk slowly during the next
period, what is the probability
that you will score:
less than 2 points
2 or 3 points
4 or 5 points
6 or 7 points
8 or 9 points
10 or 11 points
more than 11 points

__
__
__
__
__

prob.
prob.
prob.
prob.
prob.
prob.
_ _ prob.

less than 2 points
2 or 3 points
4 or 5 points
6 or 7 points
8 or 9 points
10 or 11 points
more than 11 points

17. If you jog what is the probability
that you will score:
less than 2 points
2 or 3 points
4 or 5 points
6 or 7 points
8 or 9 points
10 or 11 points
more than 11 points

__
__
__
__
__
__

19. How attractive do you
find the idea of:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.

walking
walking
jogging
running
scoring
scoring
scoring
scoring
i. scoring
j. scoring
k. scoring

slowly
normally

< 2 points
2 or 3 points
4 or 5 points
6 or 7 points

8 or 9 points

10 or 11 points
more than 11

prob.
prob.
prob.
prob.
prob.
prob.
prob.

18. If you run what is the probability that you will score:
less than 2 points
2 or 3 points
4 or 5 points
6 or 7 points
8 or 9 points
10 or 11 points
more than 11 points

prob.
prob.
prob.
prob.
prob.
prob.
prob.
extremely
attractive
[ l]
[l]
[ l]
[ l]
[ l]
[ l]
[l]
[ l]
[ l]
[ l]
[ l]

somewhat
attractive
[ 2]
[ 2]
[ 21
[2I
[2I
[ 2]
[ 2]
[ 2]
[ 2]
[ 2]
[2I

somewhat
unattractive
[31
[3]
[3 I
[ 31
[ 3]
[ 3]
[ 3]
(31
[3]
[ 31
[ 3]

prob.
prob.
prob.
prob.
prob.
prob.
prob.
extremely
unattractive
[4]
[4]
[4]
(4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
(4]
(4]

5
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20. How satisfied will you

extremely
satisfied

somewhat
satisfied

somewhat
dissatisfied

[l]
[ 11
[ l]
[l]
[ l]
[ l]
[ lJ
[lJ
[l]
[ l]
[l]
[l 1
[ l]
[l]

[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[ 2]

[2]

[ 31
[ 31
[ 31
l 3I
[ 3I
[ 3I
[ 3I
l 3J
[31
[ 3I
[ 31
[3 I
[3]

[ 2]

[3I

extremely
dissatisfied

be if you:
a. score < 2 points
b. do not score < 2 points
c. score 2 or 3 points
d. do not score 2 or 3 points
e. score 4 or 5 points
f. do not score 4 or 5 points
g. score 6 or 7 points
h. do not score 6 or 7 points
i. score 8 or 9 points
j . do not score 8 or 9 points
k. score 10 or 11 points
1. do not score 10 or 11 points
m. score more than 11
n. do not score more than 11

[2]
[2]

[2]
[2]
[2]

[2]
[2]

[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]

[4 I
[4]
[4]

[4]
[4]
[4]
[4!
[4]

21. If you try to score 2 or less points, what is the probability that you:
a. will score < 2 points
__ prob.
b. will not score < 2 points __ prob.
22. If you try to score 2 or 3 points, what is the probability that you:

a. will score 2 or 3 points
_ _ prob.
b. will not score 2 or 3 points _ _ prob.
23. If you try to score 4 or 5 points, what is the probability that you:

a. will score 4 or 5 points
__ prob.
b. will not score 4 or 5 points _ _ prob.

24: If you try to score 6 or 7 points, what is the probability that you:
a. will score 6 or 7 points
_ _ prob.
b. will not score 6 or 7 points _ _ prob.
25. If you try to score 8 or 9 points, what is the probability that you:
a. will score 8 or 9 points
_ _ prob.
b. will not score 8 or 9 points __ prob.
26. If you try to score 10 or 11 points, what is the probability that you:
a. will score 10 or ll points
__ prob.
b. will not score 10 or ll points __ prob.

27. If you try to score more than 11 points, what is the probability that you:
a. will score more than ll points
__ prob.
b. will not score more than 11 points __ prob.

6
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extremely
satisfied

28. How satisfied will you
if you score:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.

1 or more points
2 or more points
3 or more points
4 or more points
5 or more points
6 or more points
7 or more points
8 or more points
9 or more points
10 or more points
11 or more points

1 or more points
2 or more points
3 or more points
4 or more points
5 or more points
6 or more points
7 or more points
8 or more points
9 or more points
10 or more points
11 or more points

extremely
dissatisfied

[2]

(3)

(4]

[2)

[ 3J

[4]

[l]

[2]
[2]
(2 J
[2]
[2]
[2]

[3]
(3]
[ 3J
[3]
(3]
[3]

(4]
[41
[ 4]
(4]
(4]
[41
[41
[4 J
[4 J

[l]
[ l]

[l]
[ l]

[l]
[ 1)
[ 1)
[ 1)

__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__

somewhat
dissatisfied

[ l]
[ l]

29. What is the probability of scoring:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
m.
n.

somewhat
satisfied

[2]

(3]

[2 J
[2 J

[3J
[ 3J

30. How hard to you intend to
work?
[ 11 run
[ 21 jog
[ 3 J walk normally
[41 walk slowly

prob.
prob.
prob.
prob.
prob.
prob.
prob.
prob.
prob.
prob.
prob.

31. How many points do you
intend to score?
___ points.

32. How hard do you think your friends will work?
[l] run

[2] jog

(3) walk normally

[4] walk slowly

33. How many points do you think your friends will try to score?

points.

34. How hard will your friends think you should work?
(l] run

[2] jog

[3] walk normally

(4] walk slowly

35. How many points will your friends think you should
try to score? __ points.
36. Would you like to play this game again?

[l] yes

37. If this game were for sale would you buy it?

[2] no

(l] yes

[2] no

38. If your answer to question 37 was yes, how much would you be
willing to pay for it?
dollars.
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39. What was the primary determinate of how
well you performed during the last period?
[lJ
[2]
[3]
[4]
[S]
[6J
[7J
[SJ

Your own skill
Luck
Your knowledge of the game
The strategy you used
The amount of effort exerted
The difficulty of the game
Uncontrollable chance factors
Your ability

40. If you played this game again, do you
think your performance would:
[lJ
[2]
[3]
[4]
[SJ

Improve greatly
Improve somewhat
Stay the same
Be somewhat worse
Be a lot worse

41. How attractive is the coupon prize?*
[lJ
[2]
[3J
[4]
[SJ
[6]
[7]

Highly attractive
Attractive
Somewhat attractive
Neither attractive nor unattractive
Somewhat unattractive
Unattractive
Highly unattractive

42. How much would you pay for one package of coupons?*
*

~~~~-dollars.

Questions 41 and 42 were included only in the reward condition.

8
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ABSTRACT

Different individuals, with the same ability and faced with
the same environmental constraints, exert varying amounts of
effort, and, to the extent that performance is a function of
effort, achieve different levels of performance.

This study

proposes and tests a theory of motivation which is an integration
of what have previously been considered separate, and often
conflicting, theories of motivation.

The study hypothesizes that

motivational differences in effort or performance may be due to
either differences in goal level or differences in goal
commitment and tests the integrated model against

a model which

uses assigned goals to predict effort (goal setting theory), a
model which uses the expected value of goals to predict goal
choice, then uses goal choice to predict effort (expectancy
theory choice model), and a model which uses the expected value
of a goal to predict effort (expectancy theory motivational force
model).
Two hundred fifty college students enrolled at Western
Michigan University participated in a laboratory experiment using
a 2x2x2 factorial design.

The assigned goal level, the

probability of success, and the valence of the outcomes of a
ring-toss task were manipulated to assess their impact on effort
and performance over two trials.
Results generally support the unified model.

Both

individual goals and goal commitment were significant predictors

1
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of effort and performance, however goal commitment did not become
significant until Trial 2.

Apparently there was no difference in

goal commitment until subjects began to tire.

The results also

show that goal assignment affects both probability and valence
estimates.

Also, predicted goals were significantly correlated

with stated goals.

Tests against alternative formulations

demonstrated that the unified model was superior to the goal
setting model, the expectancy choice model, and the expectancy
force model.
The results of the study imply that the higher the
individual's goal, the higher the performance, individuals will
choose higher goals as long as higher goals have higher expected
value than less difficult goals, and the higher the expected
value of a goal the more committed an individual will be to the
goal.

Implications of the results for managers are discussed.

2
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